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ABSTRACT 
Factors Influencing State Prescription Drug Policy 
by Rochelle Rene’ Henderson 
 
 Within the realm of health care, prescription drugs have been of particular 
concern for state legislators in terms of cost, safety, and distribution.  Whether 
prompted by financial, social, or political pressure, states have tried to address 
issues associated with prescription medications by adopting or attempting to adopt 
a variety of prescription drug policies.  My dissertation expands beyond the 
analysis of a singular prescription drug policy and examines the factors affecting 
prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition, safety and distribution.  A negative 
binomial regression model is employed for each of the prescription drug policy 
areas to ascertain the influence of internal, external and political factors.  The 
results suggest that factors influencing state prescription drug policy differ for each 
of the policy subareas.  In particular, proportion of the population with a bachelor’s 
degree, neighboring states with a policy, and liberal ideology had an effect on the 
number of prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition.  However, the slack 
financial resources, neighboring states with a policy and issue saliency had an 
effect on the number of prescription drug policies aimed at safety.  Additionally, the 
proportion of the population with a bachelor’s degree, neighboring states with a 
policy, and interest group financial contributions to legislators had an effect on the 
number of prescription drug policies aimed at distribution.  This dissertation 
expands on our understanding of the factors influencing prescription drug policy.  
The results indicate that factors influencing one particular policy arena may vary 
when analyzing a subset of policies within a particular policy.  Specifically, the 
results suggest that factors influencing the adoption of prescription drug policy vary 
across the three types of prescription drug policies of acquisition, safety and 
distribution. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
“a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.” –         
  Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 
 
In his 1932 New State Ice Co. v. Liebman dissent, Justice Louis Brandeis is 
often credited with coining the term “laboratories of democracy.”  He indicates that 
although a weighty responsibility, states have the authority and obligation to 
experiment, lest the nation as a whole suffer.  In their role as laboratories, state 
governments have attempted to address public concerns on issues ranging from 
agriculture to transportation.  State influence and impact on citizens is paramount 
and strongly interlocked into the social and economic structure of the United 
States.  Furthermore, state policies affect almost every facet of American life 
including marriage, employment, education, and health.  Given the current political 
and economic climate, state experimentation on the issue of health care is of 
particular interest to political science scholars, the health care industry, patients 
and professional groups.    
Although health care is only one of the many issues on the public agenda, 
state and local governments have been actively involved in supporting citizens’ 
quest for good health.  With the establishment of state health boards in the 1870s, 
states to a certain degree assumed responsibility for the public’s health through 
the regulation of medicine and the promotion of sanitary and hygienic activities to 
control and prevent disease.  While initially focused on public health issues (e.g., 
water pollution, hygiene education, infectious diseases), states later addressed 
concerns of professionalism by regulating physicians, hospitals, and nursing 
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homes.  Additionally, states’ role and responsibilities in health policy continued to 
expand with the passage of Medicaid in 1965.  Through the administration and 
financial support required by Medicaid, states have become an integral part in the 
health care of the poor and aged.  In addition to the expanded reliance on states, 
medical and technological advancements are also culprits in increased cost of 
health care (Garrison, Jr. and Wilensky 46-58;Poisal et al. w242-w253).  The rising 
costs of health care, growing number of uninsured, and lack of a federal plan have 
prompted states to address issues associated with the health of their citizens.   
Within the realm of health care, prescription drugs have been of particular 
concern for state legislators both in terms of cost and utilization.  In the more than 
70 years since Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act, the number of prescription drugs that have been given FDA approval has 
reached more than 3,000 (Preskorn 41-50).  Although prescription drug costs 
account for only 10% of the total health care costs, the rate of cost increase has 
been larger than for other health care services.  While other health care services 
have experienced year over year increases in the single digits, prescription 
medications have had double digit increases from one year to the next year 
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services).  In addition to an increase in the type 
of medications available, the quantity of prescriptions sold in retail pharmacies has 
increased significantly; reaching 3.4 billion sold in 2006 (National Association of 
Chain Drug Stores Foundation). Prescription medications today are being used to 
treat a variety of ailments ranging from hypertension to erectile dysfunction and are 
being used to complement and, on occasion, replace physician office visits, 
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hospitalizations, and other medical procedures (Lichtenberg 485-490Benefits and 
costs of newer drugs: an update).  However, the effect that prescription 
medications have had on improved health outcomes has not come without a 
corollary in terms of cost, utilization, and safety.   
Whether prompted by financial, social, or political pressure, states have 
tried to address issues associated with prescription medications by adopting or 
attempting to adopt more than 3,000 policies aimed at addressing acquisition, 
safety, and distribution of prescription medications (National Conference of State 
Legislatures).  Policy scholars have not ignored this phenomenon.  For example, 
Gray, Lowery, and Godwin (2007) analyzed factors affecting prescription drug 
policy, focusing on a singular prescription policy aimed at access (i.e., Prescription 
Assistance Programs).  My dissertation expands beyond the analysis of a singular 
policy and examines the factors affecting prescription drug policies aimed at 
acquisition, safety, and distribution.  In essence, my dissertation explores the 
principal question “Why do some states tackle the issues of prescription drug 
acquisition, safety, and distribution, while others do not?”  In doing so, my 
dissertation is operationalized into four questions.  First, what are acquisition, 
safety, and distribution state prescription drug policies?  Second, in which states 
have prescription drug policies been adopted?  Third, what factors explain 
prescription drug policy adoption?  Are the explanatory factors consistent across 
the three types of prescription drug policies (i.e., acquisition, safety, and 
distribution)?  In other words, are the factors that explain prescription drug policy 
aimed at acquisition the same as the explanatory factors aimed at safety and 
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distribution?  Fourth, are the factors present in prescription drug policy consistent 
with the factors found in other health policy analyses?   
In essence, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine the demographic, 
political and institutional factors that influence whether a state chose to adopt 
prescription drug policies.  By analyzing the factors influencing the categories of 
prescription drug policies as opposed to a singular prescription drug policy, the 
dissertation explores the further application of innovation theory to the broader 
issue of prescription drug policy.   
Exploring the theoretical framework 
 With the passage of the U.S. Constitution and specifically the Tenth 
Amendment, states have self-governing legal authority to create legislation.  
Examining the factors related to legislation created by each state’s legislative 
system as it relates to prescription medications is conceivably one of the most 
interesting investigations of health policy in recent history.  Prior to model 
estimation, it is necessary to examine the theoretical framework that would assist 
in explaining the phenomenon that is state prescription drug policy which includes 
policy typology theory and innovation theory.   
Typology theory 
Although the overall objective of state prescription drug policies is to provide 
citizens with access to much needed medications while protecting their well being, 
there are variations in the types of approaches employed by states to achieve this 
goal.  The assortment of policy objectives, forms, and stakeholders involved in 
these policies suggest a difference in factors affecting state prescription drug 
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policy.  The application of policy typology theory assists in the systematic 
evaluation of the more than 3,000 prescription drug policies.  It is through the 
development of typologies that scholars have attempted to simplify the 
examination of the complex system that is public policy (Lowi 677-715;Lowi 298-
310;Wilson;Longest).   
Undoubtedly, Theodore Lowi is considered one of the most influential 
scholars in the area of policy typology.  Lowi’s theoretical development of policy 
classification allowed for the examination of policies in terms of their impact on 
society and arena of power by examining whether actors have similar interests, 
competing interests, and ideological foundation.  Simply stated, policy typology 
literature suggests that policies differ in their influence on political actors, their 
relationships and the power structure and corresponding stability.  His initial 
analysis indicated that the three unique policy types existed (i.e., distributive, 
redistributive, and regulatory) and had differing effects on politics and 
stakeholders.  Lowi defined distributive policies as those policies that benefit a few 
and most often associated with policies that bring benefits back to the 
Congressional district.  Redistributive policies benefit those of a particular class -; 
most often through the process of reallocating wealth.  According to Lowi’s 
typology, redistributive policy has clear winners and losers with the winners 
tending to be of lower social class.  Regulatory policies are those policies that limit 
or enable the actions of one group or another.  Regulatory policy “involves a direct 
choice as to who will be indulged and who deprived” (Lowi, 1964, 690). 
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Beyond simple categorization of policy, typology literature suggests that the 
stakeholders involved, policy objectives, and ideological foundation vary by policy 
category.  Lowi (1964) provides theoretical foundation suggesting that not all 
policies are created equal in terms of their effect.  While acquisition, safety and 
distribution policies may be categorized as regulatory policy, under Lowi’s 
typology, safety and distribution policies differ in their effect on policy objectives, 
stakeholders, and forms; thus, each is discussed separately in this analysis.  In the 
case of prescription drug policies, acquisition policies are those that enable or limit 
one group over another.   
Hence, for both theoretical and practical purposes, this dissertation 
employed a “big three” approach in policy presentation that is similar to John 
Kingdon’s (2003) discussion of the “big three” health policy issues (i.e., cost, 
access, and quality).  Using Lowi and Longest as a guide, the prescription drug 
policies are categorized into acquisition, safety, and distribution.  From a practical 
perspective, the categorization of prescription drug legislation into three general 
categories (1) acquisition, (2) safety, and (3) distribution allows for analysis of the 
more than 3,000 different prescription drug policies into three succinct constructs.   
At a high level, all prescription drug policies might be considered access 
because each piece of legislation is designed to either limit the means of acquiring 
medications (e.g. those considered potentially harmful) or provide the means to 
needed medications (e.g. state funding).  Although the underlying assertion of 
prescription drug policy may impact access to medications, the specific 
prescription drug policies adopted over the past ten years have coalesced around 
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three primary objectives.  The first include policies that are designed to assist 
individuals with the means to acquire prescription medications.  These policies 
include financial, informational, or institutional strategies to facilitate the acquisition 
of prescription medications.  Acquisition policies include those policies that are 
intended to increase access to needed prescription medications through 
employment of market approaches; those policies that use state dollars to assist 
the elderly or poor with access to prescription medications; policies that utilize 
institutions to maximize access.  The second set of policies includes those 
designed to address the safety issues related to prescription medications.  Safety 
policies are regulatory policies that are intended to mitigate the possibility of 
misuse, abuse, adverse drug events or medication errors.  Lastly, the policies 
designed to regulate the pharmaceutical distribution within the state borders.  
Distribution policies are regulatory policies intended prohibit or restrict the 
marketing and advertising of prescription medications or in some other way 
regulate the prescription drug distribution entities. 
Theoretically speaking, while policy specifics vary within each particular 
category (i.e., acquisition, safety, or distribution) the policy participants and 
objectives are cohesive and can thus be examined in terms of the factors affecting 
prescription drug policy.  For example, although safety and distribution would be 
categorized as regulatory, the actors, interests, and objectives are dissimilar and 
thus suggest differing factor influences.  Thus these policies were examined 
separately.  
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Innovation and diffusion theory 
In addition to typology theory, innovation and diffusion theories provide a 
framework for evaluation of the numerous state prescription drug policies.  Over 
the past 40 years, political science scholars have spent a great deal of time and 
energy investigating why state governments do something new rather than 
continuing with the status quo.  Political scientists have conducted a number of 
state policy analyses exploring the factors influencing policy adoption and diffusion 
(Walker 880-99;Mohr 111-26;Gray 1174-85;Berry and Berry 395-415;Case, Hines, 
and Rosen 285-307;Mintrom 41-59;Berry and Baybeck 505-19).  Much of their 
focus has been directed in studying the degree to which external and internal 
factors influence state policy adoption.  Previous researchers have evaluated 
policy adoption in terms of policy stages (Dye 1984) and resources (Bingham 
1976; Downs and Mohr 1974; Downs 1976; Walker 1969) and at least three 
researchers have considered the effects of internal or external determinants on 
state health policy (Gray et al., 2007b; Pracht and Moore 2003; Miller, 2005).  
Much like an Agatha Christie mystery novel, there are many suspects in the 
adoption of prescription drug policy, some of which include internal factors (e.g., 
state budget, elderly, poverty) and external factors (e.g., other state activities, 
political party control).1  While Gray, Lowery, and Godwin (2007) have used 
innovation theory to examine a single access prescription drug policy (i.e., State 
Pharmacy Assistance Programs), no known research has been conducted 
analyzing the factors affecting safety or distribution prescription drug policies. This 
                                                 
1
 In his article, Tuning in, Tuning Out:  The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America, 
Robert Putnam uses the Agatha Christie analogy to examine why citizen engagement has 
declined over time.  (Putnam 664-83;Putnam) 
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dissertation relies on innovation theory as the theoretical foundation for 
examination of the factors of prescription drug policy adoption.   
Study Specifics 
 Four approaches were used to address the key questions of interest.  First, 
a literature review on policy typology and policy innovation was conducted.  The 
theoretical framework provides the foundation for examining which factors 
influence adoption of the three types of prescription drug policy.   
 Second, state prescription drug policies were examined and categorized 
according to the policy typology previously described.  The unit of analysis was 
one observation for each state each year.  The study comprised a pooled cross-
sectional time series using data from 1999 through 2008 where each case 
represented a state-year.  Both practical and theoretical reasons guided the 
selection of this time period.  From a theoretical standpoint the last ten years have 
been the most active in terms of prescription drug policy.  The increased use, 
changes in approval process, and rising drug costs have put prescription 
medications on the public agenda.   From a practical standpoint, the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) compiled data on prescription drug policy 
for the last ten years. 
 The methodology for the classification of state prescription drug policies as 
acquisition, safety, or distribution is discussed in Chapter 6.  Given the breadth and 
depth of prescription medication use, it is conceivable that states adopt policies 
with either multiple or ambiguous objectives and are not easily categorized.  These 
prescription drug policies are isolated for additional exploration.    
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 Third, a series of maps are presented to depict the number of prescription 
drug policies by each state.  The maps illustrate the density and dispersion of 
prescription drug policies across the U.S. over the last decade.   
 Fourth, a statistical model was employed to analyze the factors influencing 
prescription policy.  For the three types of prescription drug policy, a model to 
identify the key factors that contribute to the state policy adoption was created and 
tested.  Based on the work of previous innovation and diffusion scholars as a 
framework, the explanatory variables for model consideration included state 
demographic characteristics, state wealth, interest group activity, legislative 
professionalism, issue saliency, and political factors (i.e., state ideology, legislative 
party) (Walker 880-99;Mohr 111-26;Gray 1174-85;Berry and Berry 395-415;Berry 
and Baybeck 505-19;Case, Hines, and Rosen 285-307;Mintrom 41-59;Gray, 
Lowery, and Godwin 89-129;Miller Edward Alan 2639-57).   
Dissertation Plan 
Over the course of eight chapters, this dissertation examines the state 
characteristics present in prescription drug policy expanding on the existing 
knowledge base related to policy innovation and diffusion.  In the first chapter, I 
introduce the reader to the topic of this dissertation and why it is important.  In the 
second chapter, I discuss the previous empirical evidence related to policy 
innovation and describe the theoretical constructs with which to examine state 
prescription drug policy.  This chapter discusses innovation and interest group 
literature which are critical to the examination of prescription drug policy adoption.  
In particular, I will make a case for the inclusion and/or exclusion of factors 
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attributed to influencing state policy adoption.  The third, fourth, and fifth chapters 
contain a description and discussion of the specific state prescription drug policies 
within the constructs of acquisition, safety, and distribution.  I propose that the 
factors influencing each policy category (i.e., acquisition, safety, and distribution) 
are theoretically different and thus should each be discussed in a separate 
chapter.  The sixth chapter contains my methodological approach and research 
design, while the seventh chapter presents the analytical results.  In the final 
chapter, I draw conclusions on the factors influencing state prescription drug 
policy.  In essence, I will explore how my analysis complements, contradicts, and 
contributes to the existing understanding of state prescription drug policy.  State 
lawmakers, political scientists and others may be interested to find the variation in 
factor effect across prescription drug policies.  
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CHAPTER 2:  CAUSAL MECHANISMS OF STATE PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG POLICY 
 
“He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor 
who boards ship without a rudder and compass and 
never knows where he may cast” –    
 Leonardo da Vinci 
 
Since the time of Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement, political 
scientists have developed theories intended to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of government.  From the time when Harold Lasswell first introduced the 
concept “policy science” in 1951 the concept has become a “growth industry” for 
political scientists (Lasswell 85-104;Doron 303-09).  The proliferation of 
government programs in the 1960s and 1970s to address complex public 
problems (i.e., poverty, equality, etc) created a need for more rigorous policy 
analysis (McCool).  While advances in technology made analysis of larger 
datasets easier, the complexities of the new policy process continued to challenge 
analysis (McCool).  Analysis of the unlimited number of actors, variables, and 
relationships involved in public policy proves a daunting task without an analytical 
roadmap.  It is the use of theoretical frameworks that assist in our quest to 
understand the political phenomenon. 
While many theoretical frameworks have materialized since Lasswell (1951), 
innovation and diffusion policy theories have become dominant in exploring the 
factors influencing state policy adoption.  In this chapter, I will discuss the 
theoretical framework of state policy innovation and diffusion, argue the theoretical 
application to prescription drug policy, and identify the relevant factors for 
considering the legislatures’ adoptions of state prescription drug policy. 
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Theoretical Framework 
 While the social scientist Everett Rogers ([1962], 2003) is most often 
associated with the diffusion of innovation theory, it was the early work of Walker 
(1969) that brought innovation theory to political science.  In his seminal work, 
The Diffusion of Innovations Among States,  Walker (1969, 881) defined 
innovation as “a program or policy which is new to the states adopting it, no 
matter how old the program may be or how many other states may have adopted 
it.”  In his analysis of 88 various policies, Walker established that some states 
were more expedient than other states in their policy adoption.  Succeeding 
Walker (1969), Gray (1973) concluded that while some states are faster to act 
than other states, the diffusion pattern does vary by policy topic.  Specifically, 
Gray found that states quick to adopt education laws were not necessarily that 
quick to adopt welfare or civil rights laws (1973, 1184).   
 Since the initial work of Walker (1969) and Gray (1973), innovation theory 
in political science has developed into two divergent methods of explanation.  
The first approach focuses on the internal determinants (e.g., political 
composition of legislation, unemployment rates, and public opinion) that affect 
state policy innovation.  Under the internal determinants model, a state’s internal 
socioeconomic and political factors are examined to ascertain their influence on 
state policy innovation (Sabatier). The supposition that states’ internal 
characteristics are influential is founded on previous findings suggesting a 
relationship between state policy innovation and state population, urbanization, 
wealth, and industrialization (Walker, 1969, 851-861).   
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At the heart of the second approach is the examination of external factors 
(e.g., professional networks, influence of neighboring states, influence of federal 
government) (Berry and Berry, 1990).  Unlike the internal determinants model 
which focuses on the economic, demographic, and political characteristics within 
the state, the external determinants model explores the influence of political, 
professional and financial dealings outside the state.   
 While the work of Walker (1969) and Gray (1973) focused on either the 
internal or external factors effecting state policy, Berry and Berry’s (1990) 
analysis of state lottery policy adoption incorporated both the internal and 
external determinants in a combined theory.  Berry and Berry (1990) created a 
more inclusive analytical framework by employing Mohr’s theory (1969, 111).   
Mohr indicated that public policy was a function of the “interaction among the 
motivation to innovate, the strength of obstacles against innovation, and the 
availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles”.  In essence, Berry and 
Berry (1990, 400) argue that the information gathered from neighboring states 
assist in overcoming the obstacles or uncertainty associated with innovation.  
Whether it is for reasons of competition or constraints, there is sufficient evidence 
to suggest that states’ public policies are influenced by external forces.   
Linking to Prescription Drug Policy 
Prescription drug policy can be quite complex, both substantively and in 
the policy making process.  Although there are competing values, competing 
issues, and competing solutions, a significant number of states have adopted, or 
have attempted to adopt, prescription drug policies over the past decade 
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(National Conference of State Legislatures 2009).  This begs the question of 
what factors influence state adoption of prescription drug policy.  The detailed 
discussion on varying factors affecting separate prescription drug policy construct 
is an important contribution to the innovation and diffusion literature.   
As previously mentioned, state prescription drug policy is best suited for 
analysis using the policy innovation framework.  Prior theory suggests multiple 
structural factors (i.e., citizen need, capacity of the state to meet that need, and the 
structure of the policy subsystem) influence state policy adoption (Walker 1969; 
Gray 1973).  While scholars have built upon the seminal work of Walker (1969) 
and Gray (1973) in continued examination of factors contributing to the adoption or 
attempted adoption of state policy, Gray, Lowery, and Godwin (2007) and Kingdon 
(2003, 92) provide an organizational method for discussing the factors influencing 
prescription drug policy.  While Gray, Lowery and Godwin (2007) suggest four 
possible constructs (structural conditions of the state, interest group influence, 
public preferences on an innovation and political party influence), Kingdon’s theory 
suggests examination of factors associated with the policy streams of problems, 
policies, and politics.  While this dissertation does not apply Kingdon’s theory in the 
purest form, the use of Kingdon’s theory in conjunction with Gray, Lowery, and 
Godwin (2007) provides a sound structure for examining the factors influencing 
state prescription drug policy.  
For the purpose of this analysis, structural conditions refer to the internal 
factors indicating to state legislators that a problem exists; therefore, the first set of 
factors discussed are those that indicate need for government intervention.  So, 
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how do state legislators become aware of citizen need and what means are 
available to deal with it?  As suggested by Kingdon’s assertion that indicators 
assist in bringing attention to an issue, states with a disproportionate share of 
subpopulations (i.e., elderly, poor, rural, and sick) associated with greater use of 
pharmaceuticals may serve to demonstrate the necessity for government 
intervention.   
Second, state legislators must consider the states’ means to deal with the 
issue.  Kingdon suggests that the window of opportunity for policy adoption 
increases when problems and politics are coupled with viable policy options.  
Kingdon argues that the policy community in essence creates a short list of viable 
policies that largely address the problem within the political confines (2003, 139).  
Undoubtedly, the identification of viable policy options includes those that are 
financially feasible.  The popular catch phrase “Show me the money” from the 
motion picture Jerry Maguire, seems befitting the situation.   Similarly, state 
legislators undoubtedly ask themselves “How are we going to pay for this?”  Thus, 
policies that address the funding questions undoubtedly influence the policy 
options considered and those ultimately adopted.   
Lastly, beyond demographic indicators, policy makers are also influenced 
by what Kingdon construes as political factors (i.e., national mood, election results, 
administrative and ideological changes, and interest groups).  Kingdon (2003, 163) 
denotes that these factors serve as indicators of pressure to either promote or 
deter public policy.  It is the effect of these political factors coupled with problem 
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identification and viable policy options that must converge to create windows of 
opportunity for policy adoption.   
The remainder of this chapter will discuss the factors thought to influence 
state prescription drug policy adoption.  The factors are presented in accordance 
with the supposition identified in Kingdon and Gray, Lowery and Godwin.  In 
essence, the order in which I will discuss the factors include structural conditions, 
state intrinsic characteristics, and external factors.   
Demographic Conditions 
States are comprised of a multitude of individuals with varying needs and 
wants from their state legislator.  State legislators must somehow ascertain the 
needs of the citizens by whom they were elected.  One such way is to examine the 
structural conditions of the state.  In other words, what is the situation of being 
within the state?  It seems plausible to expect state legislators to consider policies 
that impact a significant portion of their population.  It is my hypothesis that in the 
case of prescription drug policy, the states’ population aspects of age, poverty, 
education, urbanization, and health status serve as indicators to state legislators of 
the need for government action.   
State population over the age of 65:  Research suggests that the age 
distribution of citizens within a state may influence state policy adoption for two 
reasons.  First, researchers have substantiated the positive relationship between 
age and utilization of health care services (e.g., prescription medications) with 
older patients using more health services (Poisal et al. 2007; Roe and McNamara 
2002).  Thus states with a disproportionate share of citizens over the age of 65 
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may have a greater need for pharmaceuticals.  Not only are states with an older 
population more likely to adopt prescription drug policies aimed at access but 
states with a larger percentage of elderly are likely to be early adopters of health 
care reform policy (Carter and LaPlant 1997, 23).    
Second, research suggests a relationship between age and public policy.  
Specifically, evidence suggests that those over the age of 65 are more supportive 
of health policies that increase the government’s financial contribution to health 
care costs (Weaver 610-19).  Additionally, research indicates that the 
subpopulation that would benefit from the legislation is more politically active 
(Campbell 565-74).  States with a larger proportion of the politically active elderly 
have a greater likelihood to adopt generous prescription assistance programs 
(Gray, Lowery, and Godwin, 2007, 97).  State legislators may fear negative 
reaction at the next election from what is commonly perceived to be the largest 
voting community.  Founded on the evidence that older patients have greater 
utilization of prescription drugs and are more likely to be politically active, one 
could easily suppose that the greater the states proportion of elderly the more 
likely legislators to endorse prescription drug policies (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2007).  
Poverty:  In addition to addressing the needs of the elderly subpopulation, 
state legislators have adopted policies to address the health needs of the poor.  
For example, in 2006 Massachusetts adopted legislation designed to provide 
access to health insurance for all state residents (Blendon et al. 2008; Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2009).  Beyond health insurance, research indicates that 
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states’ unemployment and poverty levels have been positively linked to Medicaid 
enrollment and spending levels (Albin and Stein 1977; Carter and LaPlant 1997).  
Additionally, literature suggests that public policy for a particular group is 
influenced by the extent to which the citizen group needing assistance is 
considered worthy (Grogan 1994).  However, the fact that a significant number of 
Americans across a wide variety of socioeconomic conditions have difficulties 
paying for prescription drugs may mitigate the resistance to assist the “unworthy” 
amidst the breadth of citizens needing assistance.  Conventional wisdom suggests 
that citizen income would likely influence the individual’s ability to purchase 
prescription medications.  I hypothesize that states with a disproportionate 
population in poverty may have a greater likelihood to adopt prescription drug 
policy aimed at acquisition and safety.  On the contrary, I hypothesize that 
adoption of distribution policies which target the pharmaceutical distribution entities 
are unlikely to be influenced by the proportion of state citizenry in poverty.   
Education:  A disproportionate population of less educated citizens may 
have an effect on prescription drug policy for reasons similar to those of the elderly 
and poverty subpopulations.  Education may serve as an indicator of need.  
Evidence suggests that education is positively associated with better health 
outcomes.  As anyone who has tried to navigate the U.S. health care system 
quickly finds, health care is a complex issue.  Research indicates that individuals 
enrolled in educational programs have better health outcomes (Bunting and 
Cranor 2006; Cranor, Bunting, and Christensen 2003).  Specifically, education is a 
predictor of good health (Pincus et al. 1998, Daniels 2001).  Even when controlling 
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for age, ethnicity, and gender, individuals who fail to complete high school are 
more likely to develop chronic diseases (e.g., diabetes, cardiovascular) (Pincus et 
al. 1998).  While little evidence links education level to utilization of prescription 
medications, one could suppose that the education of an individual would be 
correlated to his or her knowledge and understanding of the disease.  Scholars 
argue that states with a greater proportion of high school graduates were more 
concerned with health risks (Shipman and Volden 840-57).  Thus states with a less 
educated population may have a greater need for government intervention.   
 Urbanization:  The evidence suggests that states with unbalanced rural and 
urban populations vary in their needs.  Specifically related to health care services, 
scholars argue that urban and regional differences exist in the need, utilization, 
access, and legislator sophistication (Holahan, Berenson, and Kacavos 1990; 
Casey 2001).  At an early age, we discover cultural differences between rural and 
urban areas by reading Aesop’s Fable, Country Mouse City Mouse.  Beyond 
fictional depictions of cultural differences, scholars have found the rural and urban 
variation in utilization of services (e.g., child care and municipal services) and 
public policy (Walker 1969, McMillan and Amoako-Tuffour 1991).   
According to the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau, over 50 million Americans live 
in nonmetropolitan areas.  Individuals living in rural areas are associated with a 
greater need for services as they are older, sicker, and poorer (Ormond, 
Zuckerman, and Lhila 2000).  In addition to need, access to care varies regionally.  
The National Rural Health Association states that in spite of 20% of Americans 
living in rural areas only 10% of physicians practice in rural areas.  In terms of 
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prescription drug policy, access to physicians has a direct link to access to 
prescription drugs in that patients are unable to secure prescription medications 
without approval of a physician.  Those in urban areas have greater access to 
health care providers and pharmacies, thus influencing their ability to get 
prescription medications.   
Beyond the influence of needs and access, research suggests that regional 
differences are associated with legislator sophistication, indicating a positive 
relationship between state urbanization and policy adoption (Walker 1969).  Based 
on the supposition that legislators from urban areas are more sophisticated and 
thus more likely to be policy innovators, scholars suggest that urbanization 
influences policy adoption.  In the case of prescription drug policy, I concur that 
urbanization will influence state prescription policy, however, contrary to Walker, I 
posit the influence is based on citizen representation of need rather than the 
legislator sophistication.  It is important to note that for the purpose of my 
dissertation urbanization refers to the metropolitan (e.g., cities and surrounding 
suburbs). Thus, I suggest that the greater the proportion of the population living in 
rural areas, the greater the influence on state prescription drug policy adoption.     
Health status:  Similar to the aforementioned factors, health status may 
serve as an indicator of need.  Although one might intuitively expect patients in 
poorer health to use more medication, scholars have empirically substantiated the 
finding that those in poor health status will consume more, regardless of insurance 
type (Poisal and Murray 2001).  The research suggests that patients in poor health 
have less price sensitivity to needed medications than those with better health 
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status (Remler and Atherly 2003).  In essence, patients with poor health have 
greater need and are less sensitive to changes in prescriptions drug costs.  
However, as prescription drug costs continue to rise, the acquisition of prescription 
medications becomes more challenging.  Undoubtedly, state legislatures have an 
interest in assisting residents with access to prescription medications.  While, I 
hypothesize that the health status of a states’ citizenry may influence the adoption 
of access and safety prescription drug policies, I can find no evidence to suggest 
that the health status would affect the adoption of distribution policies.  As 
previously mentioned, distribution policies attempt to regulate the entities involved 
in distribution not address the needs of one segment of the population.   
Institutional Characteristics  
State Financial Capacity:  Unlike the factors mentioned up to this point 
which serve as indicators of need, this factor provides an indicator of the states’ 
financial capability.  The early work of Walker (1969) and Gray (1973) found that 
wealthy states had more resources with which to explore policy options and 
therefore, were more innovative than poor states.  Additionally, scholars have 
found that resources affect policy adoption changes (Bingham 1976; Downs 1976; 
Downs and Mohr 1980; Mohr 1969; Walker 1969).  In his analysis of policies 
mandating Medicaid recipients to enroll in managed care plans, Satterwaite (2002) 
found consistent results that poor states were less likely to adopt such policies.  
Berry and Berry (1990, 411) found states with “poor fiscal health” were more likely 
to adopt lottery policy.  Unlike the lottery policy, which would bring revenue into the 
state and thus would more likely be adopted by states facing financial difficulty, 
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prescription drug policy aimed at providing prescription drugs to citizens would 
incorporate financial outlays and thus would more likely be adopted by wealthier 
states.  With regard to state pharmacy assistance programs, Gray, Lowery, and 
Godwin (2007, 115) found wealth of a state to be positively associated with 
adopting prescription drug assistance programs. 
Many states provide access to prescription medications either through the 
Medicaid program or with separate state-funding programs.  Providing such 
assistance to citizens can be quite expensive.  In 2006, states funded 7% of 
prescription medications via public assistance programs (i.e., Medicaid, SCHIP, 
and General Assistance), worker’s compensation, and temporary disability 
(National Health Expenditure).  Undoubtedly, state budgets affect the ability to pay 
for such things as prescription drugs.  In general, states have the option to either 
reduce spending or increase taxes to pay for such policies.  State legislators are 
keenly aware of the political implications of tax increases.  Therefore, I posit that 
the wealthier a state, the greater the likelihood of adopting prescription drug 
access policies. 
Legislative Professionalism.  Similar to state wealth, the degree of 
professional resources (e.g., skill, knowledge, and staff) serve as an indicator of a 
states capacity to address the complex issue of prescription drug policy.  The 
1960s reform movement to increase legislative professionalism resulted in a 
significant increase in staff, higher legislative salaries, and longer session length 
by the 1980s (King 2000; Rosenthal 1996; Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations 1985, 364).  Scholars have found that increased 
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professionalism has had a positive impact on winning elections, citizen contact, 
and initiatives among legislators (Rosenthal 1996, Berry, Berkman, and 
Schneiderman 2000; Grossback and Peterson, 2004).  The extent to which longer 
sessions and increased staff have permitted legislators to gain a significant 
understanding of the policy issue may have the potential to influence other 
legislators.  In essence, legislative experts provide information and influence other 
legislators with internal knowledge and are regarded as “trusted sources” by 
colleagues (Dahl 2005 [1950]).  As previously stated, prescription drug policy is a 
complex system involving economic, scientific, and financial constructs benefiting 
from the additional staff and session length to navigate and develop an 
understanding of the policy issue. To the extent that staffing and length of session 
have a positive effect on understanding a complex policy, one would reason that 
having session time and personnel available would also positively affect state 
prescription drug policy adoption.  
Neighboring States.  Conventional wisdom suggests that we are 
influenced by the things around us.  Scholars suggest this may also apply to 
state influences on other states (Walker 1969).  The argument rests on the idea 
that external factors on state policy adoption are a consequence of constraints 
and competition.  One of the most difficult challenges for any legislator is to figure 
out the best solution to an issue based on limited and often imperfect information.  
While rational choice theory suggests that decisions are based on complete 
knowledge surrounding the problem and potential solutions, as human beings, 
state legislators have significant limitations on what they can grasp, process, and 
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base a decision on (Lindblom 79-88;Lindblom 79-88;Kingdon vii-253;Lindblom 
79-88;Sabatier).  Legislators, like many Americans, operate in an environment 
where our actions are a consequence of time, physical, mental, and political 
constraints.  In part because of the limited time and resources to consider all 
possible options, state legislators may borrow from an already successful policy 
(Walker, 1969).  A policy that has been “tried and true” in another state may 
appear to have reduced risk and thus be more appealing to state legislators.  
State legislators may address the internal political and social constraints by 
looking to states with similar social and political characteristics (Boehmke and 
Witmer 39-51).  
In today’s environment of technological and communication 
advancements, state legislators have access to an abundance of policy 
information related to the policy actions of other states.  For example, media 
markets often service more than one state.  As a result, states may receive 
information on public policy initiatives being conducted by their neighboring state.  
In addition, state legislators may rely on personal and professional contacts for 
guidance on state policy.  Scholars argue that the presence of media and 
professional networks allow for opportunity for policy leaders to gain knowledge 
about policies and their likelihood of success (Carter and LaPlant 17-26).  
Furthermore, scholars argue that emulation of successful policies may occur 
outside of neighboring states (Karch 2007).  Specifically, legislators may also 
become aware of successful policy options through membership in professional 
organizations and attendance at professional conferences.  In addition to 
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knowledge of successful policies, research has indicated participation in 
professional organizations positively influences policy adoption.  In his 2001 
analysis of Health Maintenance Organizations, Balla (2001) found that states 
whose insurance commissioner was involved in the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners were more likely to adopt the Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO) Model Act.    
In addition to the physical, mental, and political constraints, “competitive 
federalism” may influence state policy adoption (Tiebout 1956).  States 
sometimes compete with one another for an advantage on economic 
development and to avoid being at a disadvantage on items such as welfare 
benefits (Grogan 1994, 593, Karch 2007, 62).  The similarities across states with 
regard to law, politics, language, and culture make movement between states 
easier for business.  Couple the ease of relocation with the financial benefits 
business provides to states, one can easily see why states engage in bidding 
wars to persuade business to locate in their state (Grady 1987).  States also 
incentivize business and labor through lower tax rates as evidenced by research 
reporting a positive correlation between relocation rates of citizen and business 
and the tax to service ratio of states (Tiebout 1956).   
In addition to competing for business and labor, states also face 
competition with regard to lost revenue.  In their seminal work, Berry and Berry 
(1990) posit that out of fear of losing revenue, states considering lotteries were 
influenced by whether or not neighboring states had lotteries.  Scholars have 
also found similar results that economic competition positively influences Indian 
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gaming policy adoption (Boehmke and Witmer 2004).  In both cases, the 
evidence suggests that state lawmakers may experience pressure to emulate 
public policy or face negative consequences (e.g., loss of jobs and revenue).  
States may also compete in policy adoption to avoid being attractive to unwanted 
entities (e.g., welfare recipients) (Peterson, and Rom 1990)2.  While the evidence 
suggests a seemingly consistent finding that competitive federalism influences 
state policy adoption, Berry and Baybeck (2005) indicate that states may 
compete on issues such as state lottery but not on the issue of welfare benefits, 
thus suggesting that the influence of competition varies by policy issue.  
Additionally, on the issue of pharmacy assistance programs, Grogan (1994) 
presents evidence suggesting the neighboring effect to be nil on actual policy 
adoption yet have a negative effect on program generosity and a positive effect 
on program expansion. 
The research literature has suggested that the policy adoption of other 
states may influence state policy adoption.  In the case of prescription drug 
policy, I speculate this to be the case, particularly on the issue of acquisition and 
distribution.  While state legislators may be more influenced by competitive 
federalism on the issue of distribution, on the issue of prescription drug policies 
aimed at acquisition, state legislators may look to other states for both reasons of 
emulation and competition.  
Interest Group Influence 
                                                 
2
 Scholars have challenged this supposition on the basis of methodological design flaws including 
failure to adjust for inflation (Volden, 2002, 353). 
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According to E.E. Schattschneider (1986, 247), “The diet on which the 
American leviathan feeds is something more than a jungle of disparate special 
needs.”  While most individuals, not just the political scientists, are aware of the 
escalating number of interest groups since the 1960s and 1970s, it is political 
scientists who have explored the influence of interest groups (Walker, 1983; 
Berry, 1987, Baumgartner and Leech, 2001, Yackee and Yackee, 2006).  In 
general, the research indicates that business interest groups are prolific in 
politics and that they are influential in policymaking (Baumgartner and Leech 
2001; Yackee and Yackee 2006).  In 2002, of the 17,880 registered lobbyists in 
Washington DC, 40% indicate advocating for a health care issue.  In other words, 
there were 13 health care lobbyists for every member in the U.S. Congress.  
(Glabman 2002).  Prescription drug policy is no different than other health policy 
issues in regard to the breadth and depth of interest groups.  To illustrate 
Schattschneider’s point of diverse interests, one need only look at the issue of 
prescription drug policy at the federal level where the involvement of 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), AARP, 
American Hospital Association (AHA) American Association of Health Plans 
(AAHP), American Medical Association (AMA), U.S. Chamber of Commerce was 
present (Oliver, Lee, and Lipton, 2004; Weissert and Weissert 2006).  It has been 
suggested that the more than 400 pages of MMA legislation was significantly 
influenced by lobbyists (Hall and Van Houweling 2006).  
While legislators face considerable political pressure from a myriad of 
health care interests, according to some scholars, interest groups provide an 
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indispensable service through their willingness to provide information and 
campaign support (Dahl 1961; Kingdon 2003; Lindblom 1959; Weissert and 
Weissert 2006).  Policy innovation commands labor resources necessary to 
research policy options and correlated costs (Mohr 1969).  Lobbyists can employ 
techniques of testifying at legislative hearings, meeting personally, and doing 
favors to affect what the government does (Nownes 2006, 17).  Additionally, the 
willingness to write letters, make calls, etc. can potentially get the attention of 
government officials (Heaney 2006, 891).  Scholars argue that the interest group 
engagement in the political process can have an effect on the government’s 
agenda (Kingdon 2003).  While the evidence suggests that interest groups are 
influential in public policy, scholars have argued that interest groups tend to favor 
business (Schattschneider 1986).  However, Grogan (1994) suggests that 
influence of business and provider may be greater when the public interest is 
low.   
The interest groups most commonly associated with prescription drug 
policy are those representing drug manufacturers.  Groups representing health 
service providers (e.g., Illinois Pharmacist Association) and groups representing 
patients (e.g., National AIDS Foundation) are also active prescription drug policy.  
For example, the National AIDS Foundation website indicates advocating 
expansion of access to Narcan a useful to reverse the onset of overdose (Aids 
Foundation of Chicago).  Whereas, the Illinois Pharmacist Association website 
indicates their mission is “dedicated to enhancing the professional competency of 
pharmacists, advancing the standards of pharmacy practice, improving 
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pharmacists’ effectiveness in assuring rational drug use in society, and leading in 
the resolution of public policy issues affecting pharmacists” (Illinois Pharmacists 
Association) 
At the state level, research indicates that advocacy organizations can 
have a strong positive effect on health policy (Miller 2007; Pracht and Moore 
2003).  Grogan (1994) found that the pressure exerted by interest groups 
affected state Medicaid policy decisions.  While Gray, Lowery, and Godwin 
(2007) argue that the effect may be greater on the policy revisions as opposed to 
policy adoption, interest groups such as the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) have been successful in stopping or at least 
delaying policy adoption.  In the case of preferred drug lists and Medicaid 
discounts, PhRMA filed lawsuits in Michigan, Florida, and Maine to challenge 
state legislation.  This same group was also successful in restricting the 
importation of prescription medications from Canada (Silow-Carroll and Alteras 
2004).  The impact of interest groups state policy adoption may be reflective of 
the sheer magnitude of contacts at a state level compared to that at a national 
level. 
Consistent with research literature, I hypothesize adoption of state 
prescription drug policy will be influenced by the involvement of interest groups.  
In particular, state regulatory policies aimed at distribution of prescription drugs 
will be of particular interest to those representing the distributive entities.  
Similarly, state legislation related to acquisition and safety of prescription 
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medications is of particular interest to the entities representing the patients and 
providers.    
 
 
Public Preference 
Issue Salience:  Scholars have long since recognized that issues matter.  
The seminal work on Congress found that legislator actions are different for issues 
that get local or national attention compared to issues that are not (Mayhew 1974; 
Fenno 1978).  Additionally, research indicates that issues of broad public concern 
affect public policy in terms of attention, timing, and type (Dahl 1969; Key 1961).  
Americans face many challenges in their day to day lives; however, it is the 
movement from a personal challenge to a public distress that increases the 
salience of an issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 27; Northington, Gamble and 
Stone 2006).  Kingdon suggests that problems that violate our societal values are 
likely to be construed as a problem needing attention (2003, 198).  The strongest 
of those values include equity, individual responsibility, and faith in market 
solutions.  As demonstrated in the latest public discourse over health care reform, 
perception of inequitable distribution of health care resources has moved the issue 
from an individual problem to a government problem.   
Momentous issues that resonate with the public will undoubtedly gain 
greater legislative attention than issues with minimal interest which will quickly 
dissipate from the public agenda (Weissert and Weissert 2006, 333).  At the 
national level, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 illustrated how the salience 
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of an issue can factor into policy adoption.  The rising costs of prescription 
medications, a critical issue for seniors (a major voting bloc), became an important 
matter for legislators.  Additionally, it has been suggested that the saliency of 
issues may be stronger if they can be associated to a “villain” (Downs 1972).  In 
the case of prescription drug policy, the issue of rising drug costs is often 
associated with the “villainous” entities that are pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
insurance companies.  
Additionally, issues that are perceived as critical will impact the timing and 
type of public policy.  For salient issues that are perceived as critical, citizens 
expect immediate attention and appear comfortable in leaving the specific policy 
details to the experts.  At the national level, prescription drug policy has a long 
standing practice of materializing subsequent to triggering events (Grabowski and 
Vernon 1983).  For example, each of the three defining periods of the Food and 
Drug Administration regulatory policies resulted from a triggering event.  The first 
period is demarcated by the actions of muckrakers like Samuel Hopkins Adams 
and Upton Sinclair.  Subsequent to their expose’, industry, legislators, and the 
general public got behind food and drug regulation, eventually passing the 1906 
Pure Food and Drug Act (Hilts 2003, 51).  The article written by Samuel Hopkins 
Adams in Collier’s revealed the levels of acetanilide in Cuforhedake Brane-Fude 
was responsible for at least twenty-two deaths; these revelations subsequently 
mobilized public concern.3  While this remedy was, as the name implies, aimed at 
reducing headaches, it was comprised of alcohol, caffeine, and acetanilide4.  
                                                 
3
 Most of the historical accounts of FDA are from Hilts 2003. 
4
 Acetanilide was commonly used as a pain reliever but was later found to be related to blood disorders. 
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Although the previous triggering events resulted in legislation, journalists, 
consumer protection groups and even the FDA itself indicated a need for 
additional legislation to address gaps in the 1906 law.  However, it was not until a 
cataclysmic event involving the death of more than 100 individuals took place that 
public policy was adopted.  The details surrounding the event included the 
Massengill Company of Tennessee, which developed and sold a product for 
children that contained a chemical similar to antifreeze.  One of the gaps of the 
1906 Act was that food and drugs did not have to be tested for safety (U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration). The tragedies of the 1930s rallied support for a change 
to food and drug law.  Shortly after the catastrophic event, Roosevelt signed the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) into law.   
As clearly demonstrated by events surrounding FDA policies and health 
care reform, cost, safety, and distribution of prescription medications are concerns 
that resonate with citizens.  In essence, the “government does what the people 
want in those instances where the public cares enough about an issue to make its 
wishes known” (Wright, Erickson, McIver 1987, 981). Therefore, I hypothesize that 
issue saliency positively affects the adoption of prescription drug policy.   
Political Influence 
Ideology:  To the extent that the goal of elected officials is to gain as much 
public support as possible in hopes of getting reelected, policies that are consistent 
with prevailing beliefs or values of the citizens are more likely to be adopted than 
when those beliefs are threatened (Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek 1973).  
Generally speaking, citizen beliefs and values are manifested through association 
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as either conservative or liberal.  Mohr (1969) identifies ideology as a motivating 
factor in the construction of public policy.  Scholars suggest that within a state it is 
the public identification as liberal or conservative that impacts policymaking; 
superseding the effect of the demographic factors (i.e., age, poverty, education, 
urbanization, and wealth) (Wright, Erikson, and McIver, 1987).  For example, those 
states supporting civil rights and health policy are most commonly associated with 
liberal ideology.  The innovation of public policy is believed to occur more 
frequently in states with liberal ideology because of their willingness to bring more 
issues to the table and their openness to experimentation (Nice, 1984).  On the 
issue of health care policy, several scholars deem ideology to be a significant 
influence (Starr 1982; Marmor 2000; Miller 2005).   
Based on the literature research, I argue that states with a disproportionate 
liberal citizenry will be more likely to adopt acquisition, distributive and safety 
policies than those with a conservative ideology.  As indicated earlier, assisting 
with access to prescription medications is a redistributive policy in that it requires 
taxpayers to subsidize the medical care of those in need.  Additionally, the 
regulatory nature of acquisition, safety, and distribution policies challenges our 
societal belief of reliance on the market solutions and laissez-faire approach.  
Thus, I hypothesize that those states with a more liberal ideology will be more 
likely to adopt  
Political Party Control:  Both in terms of public policy and government elections, 
political parties have undoubtedly played a fundamental role in the United States.  
From America’s infancy, the utility of political parties was quite apparent 
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particularly to people such as Thomas Jefferson, who revealed in a letter to Henry 
Lee (1824) that “they (political parties) are censors of the conduct of each other 
and useful watchmen for the public."  In addition to serving as a watchful eye, 
political parties simplify the political choice in terms of candidates and policies 
(Nivola and Rosenbloom 1986).  Through the political primary process, political 
parties abridge the list of potential candidates.  Beyond safeguarding against 
abuses by the other party and condensing the pool of political candidate, political 
party ideology, issue selection, and committee staffing have been linked to policy 
adoption.   
According to Erikson (1971), political party made a difference in adoption 
of progressive civil rights legislation; states with Republican or divided control 
were less likely than nonsouthern states with Democratic control of both the 
legislature and the governorship to adopt progressive civil rights legislation.  At a 
national level, one of the most significant prescription drug policies (i.e., MMA 
2003) was passed under a Republican Congress and Republican President; 
however state level analysis suggests that Democratic states are more likely to 
support distributive policies than those aimed at regulating business.  To the 
extent that the state prescription drug policies are redistributive or regulatory, I 
posit the less likely to be supported by states with Republican controlled 
legislatures.   
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Chapter Summary 
 It is no surprise that cost and access are challenges to the U.S. health 
system.  Equally well known is the fact that policymakers have spent the better 
part of 80 years attempting reform to address the various challenges to our health 
care system.  At the state level, lawmakers have adopted or attempted to adopt 
policies to address the cost and access of prescription drug policies.  However, 
variation in policy adoption of prescription drugs is as varied as the states 
themselves.  By utilizing innovation and diffusion theory, one can gain a better 
understanding of the factors affecting prescription drug policy.   
 As presented in this chapter, the literature research suggests that state 
policy adoption of state prescription drugs is influenced by the population 
composition, financial capability, legislative professionalism, neighboring states, 
interest groups, issue saliency, ideology, political party, and political control. Table 
1 identifies the influential factors and their hypothesized influence which will be 
further discussed in Chapter 6.  Through the use of innovation and diffusion theory 
one can explore the phenomenon of state prescription drug policy.  More 
specifically, one can identify and examine the factors that influence acquisition, 
safety and distribution policies.  
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Factor Acquisition Safety Distribution 
Age + + 0 
Poverty + + 0 
Education + + + 
Urbanization + + 0 
Health Status + + 0 
State Wealth + + 0 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
+ + + 
Neighboring State 
Policy Adoption 
+ + + 
Interest Group 
Influence 
+ 0 + 
Issue Salience + + + 
Political Ideology + + + 
Political Control + 0 + 
Table 1:  Factors Influencing State Prescription Drug Policies 
This table highlights the hypothesized effect of each factor on the prescription drug 
policy classification.  A plus sign indicates a positive effect on state prescription 
drug policy.  A zero indicates no effect on state prescription drug policy adoptions.  
A negative sign indicates a negative effect on state prescription drug policy. 
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CHAPTER 3:  STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG POLICY:  ACQUISITION 
 
What can be added to the happiness of man who is in health, out of 
debt, and has a clear conscience?- Adam Smith 
 
For some individuals, the growing expense of prescription medications has 
made it difficult to attain the happiness described by Adam Smith.  In fact, patients 
have been forced to modify their utilization of prescription medications, perhaps 
sacrificing health to avoid debt (Cunningham, Miller, and Cassil 2008).  Beyond the 
individual, states are reeling from the economic pinch as well.  State and local 
government prescription drug costs exceeded $200 billion in 2005 compared to 
only $3.7 million in 1960, prior to the adoption of Medicare and Medicaid (Center 
for Medicaid and Medicare Services 2008).5  Price inflation, therapeutic drug mix, 
newer more costly medications, and increased utilization all contribute to the 
increased cost of prescription medications (Express Scripts Drug Trend Report 
2007).  Out of necessity, states have had to be innovative in terms of how to pay 
for prescription medications.  The legislative approaches to prescription drug policy 
are as different as the states themselves.  Thus, in order to determine the factors 
influencing prescription drug policy, one must closely examine the policies.   
As mentioned above, the past ten years have produced a multitude of state 
prescription drug policies, coalescing around the three general constructs of 
acquisition, safety, and distribution.  For the purpose of this analysis, acquisition 
policies are defined as those that rely on financial mechanisms, use state dollars to 
assist citizens with access to prescription medication, or policies that utilize 
institutions to maximize access.  In particular, acquisition policies include 
                                                 
5
 Not adjusted for inflation. 
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legislation related to Medicaid and Medicare.   While current provisions within 
Medicare and Medicaid provide some resources to assist the poor and elderly with 
the acquisition of prescription medications, state legislators have adopted policies 
to maximize the utility of these programs.  For example, states have adopted 
legislation to take advantage of federally negotiated pricing for prescription 
medications.   
Additionally, acquisition policies included legislation that employ economic 
principles of supply and demand.  The United States has a long standing tradition 
of reliance on market solutions to address public problems, and state prescription 
drug policy is no exception.  While policy specifics vary, state policies intended to 
expand access to prescription medications have generally been based on the 
economic theory of supply and demand.  In general, state legislators employ two 
policy approaches: one aimed at the price of prescriptions and the other aimed at 
the quantity demanded.  Policies intended to affect the price utilize a myriad of 
strategies including maximization of purchasing power, price controls, and other 
financial incentives.  On the demand side, states’ have utilized incentives to 
encourage patients to demand the equally efficacious affordable options.  In 
essence, state legislators hope to increase access to needed prescription 
medications by reducing the financial barriers patients confront. 
Table 2 is a list of the eight policies selected from the National Council of 
State Legislatures and included in the acquisition classification.  Only legislation 
designed to increase access through a policy associated with Medicare or 
Medicaid, those policies attempting to intercede on the price or quantity of 
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prescription medications, or utilized institutions to maximize access were included 
in the acquisition classification.  It is my supposition that the summative 
categorization of acquisition policies allows for a more parsimonious analysis of 
the factors influencing prescription drug policies.  Chapter six describes the 
methodological approach to categorization.  During my analytical time period, 
executive orders related to prescription drug policy did occur; however, state 
legislative actions are the focus of this analysis.  Although each state may not be 
specifically mentioned, each of the various access policies adopted by states over 
the past decade will be discussed in this chapter.  While this chapter independently 
presents the policies used by states to increase access to prescription 
medications, many of these approaches are used in conjunction with one another.  
It is this combination of approaches within one policy that further supports my 
analytical approach to examine factors that affect access prescription drug 
policies.  For example, many of the states will have both a brand and generic 
component within the same policy. 
Name of Acquisition Prescription Drug Policies 
Expand use of 340B drug discount price program  
Bulk Purchasing 
Rx discount programs 
Medicare Prescription Drug Act(MMA) 
State Rx subsidy program 
Importation 
Tax deductions 
Preferred Drug List 
Generic drug use 
Access to brand name pharmaceutical products 
Table 2:  Types of Prescription Drug Acquisition Policies  
This table presents the prescription drug policies identified as Acquisition. 
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Price-Side Approaches 
Expanded use of 340b drug discount price program 
One of the prominent mediums by which states provide access to 
prescriptions is through the federal entitlement program, Medicaid.  Established in 
the 1960s as a way to assist the poor in accessing health care, Medicaid is a 
program that grants states liberty in design and administration within the broad 
general guidelines of the federal government.  States have authority in setting 
eligibility criteria and benefits.  In 2007, the total Medicaid outlay was $333.2 billion 
with the federal government paying about 57% to finance health care for 
approximately 49.1 million people (Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, 
2008; Kaiser Family Foundation 2009).  Medicaid provides a safety net by funding 
health care for one in five Americans.  During economic downturns, when states 
face additional demand for assistance and a decrease in revenue stream, 
providing assistance becomes particularly problematic.     
In reaction to financial pressure, states have explored many viable options 
to reduce prescription drug costs.  One possible solution has come at the hands of 
the federal government.  Under the expansion of the 340b Drug Pricing Program, 
states are able to secure reduced pricing for prescription medications (Mertz 
2007).  According to the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program under the Omnibus 
Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990), manufacturers are required 
to afford drug rebates to State Medicaid agencies.  Subsequent to OBRA 1990, 
the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 established the 340b Drug Pricing Program 
of 1992, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 
which required manufacturers to limit the cost of covered outpatient drugs for 
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federally qualified health centers.  Specifically within the DHHS, the program is 
administered by the Pharmacy Affairs Branch (PAB) of the Bureau of Primary 
Health Care.  So how does a country that reveres freedom of the market get an 
industry with one of the most influential interest groups to agree to limit its prices?  
While participation was voluntary, manufacturers who failed to participate would 
not receive the federal Medicaid matching funds as stipulated under the Medicaid 
Program (Health Resources and Services Administration 2009).   
In an opportunity to reduce the costs of prescriptions paid by governmental 
entities, state agencies and counties were authorized, and encouraged, to search 
for opportunities to utilize the 340b pricing.  Table 3 presents the type of entities 
that are considered appropriate federally-qualified health centers.  Given that the 
340b program was established in 1992, all states had adopted the initial program; 
however, economic pressure and increased demand for Medicaid assistance have 
forced states to expand their use of the 340b program.  Undoubtedly, the push for 
greater participation in the 340b program resulted from financial pressure; the 
1998 DHHS audit highlighted the underutilization of the program (Brown, 1998).  
According to the 1998 audit, two-thirds of eligible HRSA grantees did not 
participate, thus leaving money on the table.   
Over the past decade a number of states have adopted legislation to 
expand the use of 340b within their states.  In general, state expansion has 
entailed legislative action mandating state agencies participate or encourage 
education about the benefits of the 340b program.  While states like Maine and 
New Hampshire have adopted legislation mandating state agencies explore the 
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increased use of 340b program for many diseases, other states like Utah have 
targeted specific diseases such as hemophilia.  The results have been significant 
with states like Rhode Island (Heinz Foundation Report) reporting $2 million dollars 
in savings the first year and other states reporting between 20% to 50% off of 
Average Wholesale Price6 (Scholz 2008).   
  
                                                 
6
 Average Wholesale Price is defined as the national price by Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services 
regulation (42 C.F.R §405.517). 
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Types of Entities Eligible 
Disproportionate share hospitals 
Family planning projects 
Community health centers 
Federally Qualified Health Center Look-Alikes (FQHCLA) 
Migrant health centers 
Section 340S school-based programs 
Health centers for residents of public housing 
Health centers for the homeless 
Tribal contract clinics 
State-operated AIDS drug assistance programs (ADAPs) 
Black lung clinics 
Comprehensive hemophilia diagnostic treatment centers 
Native Hawaiian health centers 
Urban Indian organizations 
Entities receiving assistance under the Ryan White Care Act 
Sexually transmitted disease (STD) clinics 
Tuberculosis (TB) clinics 
Table 3:  Entities Eligible to Participate in the 340b Drug Price Program  
This table presents the entities approved to apply for participation in the 340b Drug 
Price Program administered by DHHS.  Source: PL 102-585 Section 602.  
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Bulk Purchasing 
In addition to exploring prospects presented at the federal level, states have 
looked within and across borders for opportunities.  The result is that states have 
entered into intragovernmental or intergovernmental state purchasing agreements.  
In essence, these purchasing pool arrangements allow states to combine their 
orders and buy in bulk, thereby obtaining a reduced purchase rate and increased 
rebates for prescription medications.  While some states have entered into these 
arrangements to reduce the prescription medication costs related to Medicaid, 
other states have entered into these arrangements for all prescription medications 
purchased by the state regardless of group (e.g., state employees and SCHIP).  
Intragovernmental purchasing pools like the one in the state of Georgia created the 
Department of Community Health (DCH) to oversee the purchasing of prescription 
drugs for the entire state.  The DCH negotiates on the behalf of state agencies to 
facilitate the best prescription drug purchase price (Krause 2004).  On the other 
hand, states like Delaware, Missouri, New Mexico, and West Virginia have formed 
the intergovernmental purchasing group RXIS.  Under RXIS, the states utilize the 
services of a Pharmacy Benefit Manager (PBM) to negotiate with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers for greater drug discounts.  The multi-state pooled purchasing 
reported substantial savings from the better negotiated price (Krause 2004).  While 
pooled purchasing arrangements offer significant benefits in terms of cost and 
pharmacy management, they also present states with significant managerial and 
political challenges (National Governors Association 2004).  In order to optimize 
the savings and strengthen their bargaining power, states need to develop similar 
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lists of covered medication7. In doing so, the state is pushing market share to a 
particular product, therefore, maximizing the savings.  Developing a multi-state 
coalition requires the political prowess necessary to navigate through the logistical 
challenges associated with such an endeavor. 
Prescription Drug Discount Programs 
 The variety of prescription drug discount programs is almost as varied as the 
states themselves; however, the objective is consistent.  State legislators are 
exploring opportunities to reduce the prescription drug costs facing their 
constituents of which drug discount programs have become one such method.  
While Medicaid provides a safety net for many, there are many Americans who 
exceed the financial qualifications for Medicaid but still have difficulty paying the 
high price of prescription medications.  In an effort to assist these individuals, 
states like Maine, Illinois, Hawaii, and Iowa have negotiated with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to create drug discount programs.  Patients who are not eligible for 
Medicaid may enroll in these programs and receive discounts on their medications.  
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (2009), half of all states 
offer some form of prescription drug discount programs.  While multiple states 
have drug discount programs, the eligibility requirements and estimated discounts 
vary by state.  For example, Maine residents who meet income requirements may 
enroll in the discount program, Maine Rx, to save 15% on branded medication and 
60% on generic medications (State of Maine, 2009).  On the other hand, 
Colorado’s Cares Rx program negotiated with pharmacies to offer residents, who 
do not have health insurance but do meet the financial necessity criteria, 
                                                 
7
 Preferred Drug Lists are discussed later in this chapter.   
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prescription medications at a fixed price for individuals (State of Colorado, 2009).  
Similarly, Iowa’s Drug Card program has negotiated with pharmacies to offer 
savings between 30 to 70%; however, the Iowa program has no income or 
insurance requirement (Iowa Drug Card Program, 2009).  
 While drug discount programs have significant benefits to citizens in terms of 
dollars, not everyone has been supportive of the programs.  In the case of Maine, 
PhRMA challenged that the state was in violation of interstate commerce and 
harmful to Medicaid recipients (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America v.Walsh, 2003).  Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the court ruled in 
favor of Maine, stating that neither undue harm nor violation of interstate 
commerce had occurred (Reforming States Group, 2003). 
Medicare Modernization Act  
  On December 8, 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law one of the 
largest Medicare changes.  Simply stated, the Medicare and Modernization Act of 
2003 (also referred to as MMA or Part D) was designed to provide prescription 
drug coverage for Medicare enrollees (CMS PL108-173 summary).  With the 
passage of MMA, Medicare eligible citizens had access to prescription drugs. Prior 
to the passage of MMA, Medicare beneficiaries could purchase supplemental 
insurance coverage that covered prescription medications or, if eligible, enroll in 
Medicaid.  However, the legislation resulted in more than 400 pages detailing a 
complex policy.  While the legislation was signed in 2003, the program was 
phased in with the federal government offering a drug discount program beginning 
in 2005 and going into full effect in 2006.  In 2005, Medicare enrollees could sign 
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up for a drug discount program similar to the states’ plans previously discussed but 
at the federal level.  In 2006, Medicare enrollees were able to enroll in Part D 
plans. 
 In response to MMA, states began crafting legislation to deal with issues 
brought about by MMA.  In particular, the states developed policies to address the 
immediate needs of dual-eligibles.8  According to NCSL, 37 states adopted policies 
to temporarily assist dual-eligibles in the acquisition of prescription medications 
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 Prescription Drug State 
Legislation).  While most of the state legislation occurred in the 2006, states have 
continued to produce legislation to address MMA dilemmas.    
State Subsidy 
 While the passage of MMA resulted in access to prescription medications for 
seniors, it was not comprehensive.  Members enrolled in Medicare Part D are still 
responsible for deductibles and copayments, thereby influencing their ability to 
purchase prescription medications.  Often termed “wrap arounds,” the subsidy 
programs pay the premiums, deductibles, and copayments associated with 
prescription medications for Medicare enrollees who meet financial eligibility 
requirements.  Similar to the drug discount programs, the criteria and coverage 
vary by state.  Most states’ pharmacy assistance plans (SPAPs) pay for 
deductibles, copays, and pharmaceuticals of those residents who do not reach a 
percentage of federal poverty level.  For example, the state of Hawaii program has 
                                                 
8
 According to the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services website dual-eligible is defined as 
“individuals who are entitled to Medicare Part A and/or Part B and are eligible for some form of Medicaid 
benefit.” Definition available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DualEligible/ 
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limited benefits to individuals who have an income of up to 100% of the federal 
poverty level.   A number of states, such as New York, Illinois, Hawaii, and Indiana, 
have adopted these Medicare wrap around policies. States like Delaware and 
Indiana have placed an annual subsidy limit per senior.  According to Arizona’s 
website, the copayment subsidy provided to seniors will be the latest casualty in 
the current economic crisis.  As of February 2009, Arizona dual-eligible citizens will 
no longer be receiving financial assistance with prescription drug copayments. 
Importation  
In addition to domestic opportunities to save money, states have looked to 
international opportunities for discounted medications.  While the reimportation of 
prescription medications is in violation of the United States Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938, in 2004, the state of Illinois developed a program whereby 
citizens could order a 90 day refill of their branded medications from Canada, 
United Kingdom, and Ireland.  Under the I-Save Rx program, the state of Illinois 
contracted with CanaRx, a Canadian Pharmacy Benefit Manager, to allow 
residents the opportunity to purchase prescription medications at a lower cost.  
Use of the program is limited to patients who have already received their initial 
prescription medications in the U.S. and limited to certain brand medications.  
Generic medications, narcotics, and prescriptions requiring special handling such 
as refrigeration are not available through this program.  According to a press 
release, the citizens of Illinois have saved 25% to 50% on 13,778 submitted 
prescription drug orders (State of Illinois, 2006).  States like Kansas, Wisconsin, 
Missouri and Vermont have joined the I-Save Rx program.  While the program 
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offers the potential for significant savings, citizen use has been lower than 
anticipated for a couple reasons (State of Illinois Office of the Auditor General, 
2008).  First, physicians argue safety concerns associated with reimportation of 
prescription medications and argue for greater use of domestic generic 
medications as opposed to reliance on foreign suppliers (Kesselhelm and 
Choudhry, 2008).  While the I-Save Rx program relied on pharmacies approved by 
Illinois Health inspectors , the Canadian pharmacies began looking to other 
countries such as Fiji to supplement their supply when pharmaceutical 
manufacturers reduced the Canadian supply (Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, 
11/04/2005).  Undoubtedly, the issue of Canada serving as a pass through country 
for prescription medications significantly raised the safety concerns.  Second, the 
FDA flexed its administrative muscle by seizing prescription medications ordered 
from Canada, thus creating concern in citizens as to whether or not their 
prescription medication would actually arrive (Manning, 2004). 
The reimportation of prescription medications was particularly pertinent prior 
to the passage of Medicare and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).  As previously 
mentioned, the elderly are the largest consumers of prescription medications.  
Prior to MMA, news reports of seniors being bused to Canada were commonplace.  
Policy makers were undoubtedly motivated to take legislative action that would 
benefit a large voting bloc.  As such, states adopted these drug reimporation 
programs.  However, after the passage of MMA, which provides prescription drug 
coverage to seniors, the need to seek lower cost drugs from Canada has 
somewhat subsided.  
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Taxing Policies 
 Taxation dates back to Ancient Egypt when the pharaoh would assess the 
people and collect revenue in the form of grain, cattle, and labor.  Although now 
paid monetarily, taxation remains an important government utility; that theoretically 
supplies the necessary revenue for services, such as financial assistance for 
prescription drugs.  However, one should note that the U.S. has a long standing 
history with taxpayer revolt spanning more than 200 years beginning with events 
surrounding the American Revolution through the 1970s tax revolt to current Tax 
Day Protests (Kingdon 2003, 213; Reynolds 2009).  Given that politicians are 
undoubtedly cognizant of political fallout associated with taxation, it would seem 
fitting that states sparingly approve prescription drug policies incorporating taxing 
mechanisms (e.g., levying, deductions, or exemptions).  While only two states 
have adopted a prescription drug taxing policy, Louisiana has adopted two such 
policies.  One policy applies a sales tax on prescription drugs paid by health 
insurance issuers, members, or insureds, while the other policy exempts 
prescription drugs purchased through Medicare Part D from local sales and use 
tax (Chapter 582; Act 608).  In addition, Washington provided tax deductions to 
physicians and clinics for cost of drugs that are not typically self-administered 
(Washington State Department of Revenue 2007).   
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Preferred Drug Lists 
 Similar to pooled purchasing or drug discount programs, Preferred Drug 
Lists (PDLs) are another mechanism used to combat the rising costs of 
prescription medications.  States negotiate with pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
obtain manufacturer rebates in exchange for a product being placed on the 
preferred drug lists.  By and large, PDLs operate as a type of drug formulary 
identifying the drugs that will be reimbursed by the payer (e.g., employer, 
government, or health insurance company).  In essence, patients face a lower 
copayment or discount by limiting their medications to those on the preferred drug 
lists.  Patients who require medications not on the list may face higher copayment 
or be required to demonstrate clinical necessity in the form of a prior 
authorization.9  Research suggests that PDLs are consistent across states with at 
least nine states having the same list (Ketchum and Ngai, 2008).  The lists are not 
strictly created based on financial considerations but must also meet clinical 
requirements and be approved by drug utilization review boards.  However, health 
service providers have expressed concern related to the negative impact on health 
status and health outcomes.  In particular, physicians have raised concern about 
the delay or discontinuation of drug therapy that may result from patients being 
required to get prior authorization from drugs not on the PDL (Elam et al, 2005). 
Additionally, research suggests that while states may be saving money by limiting 
drugs to those with a lower cost, they may be spending more in terms of increased 
hospitalizations and office visits (Murawski, 2005).   
                                                 
9
 Prior authorization is an administrative tool requiring that a physician obtain approval from a payer prior 
to prescribing the medication (MacKinnon and Kumar, 2001).  Medications typically listed on PDLs do not 
require prior authorization.   
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Quantity-Side Approaches 
Generic Drug Use 
 The availability of generics is nothing new.  Generic products are available 
in everything from peas to pencils and are most often priced at a considerable 
discount compared to their branded counterparts.  In that way, generic products 
offer consumers an opportunity to save money.  Generic medications provide a 
way to reduce the costs of prescription drugs by providing a safe and lower cost 
alternative to branded products.  As the dollars spent on pharmaceuticals continue 
to rise, payers (e.g., patients, employers, and insurance companies) look for ways 
to reduce the costs.  One such way is through the use of generic medications.  
According to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) a generic medication is 
“identical, or bioequivalent to a brand name drug in dosage form, safety, strength, 
route of administration, quality, performance, characteristics, and intended use.” 
(US Food and Drug Administration, 2007).  According to the Kaiser Family 
Foundation (2007), generic medications cost $32 per prescription compared to 
$111 for brand medication.  The difference in cost indicates that generic 
medication cost a third less than brand medication.  The potential savings have 
prompted states to capitalize on the savings through legislative means.  In general, 
states have adopted two policy approaches to encourage the use of generic 
medications, one targeting the patient and the other targeting the physician. 
 Patient related policies have focused on allowing automatic switching from 
brand to generic products.  Starting in 1989, states began to pass legislation 
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allowing pharmacists to automatically dispense generic medications in place of 
branded medications.  Prior to 1989, most states legally prohibited a pharmacist 
from dispensing a drug other than the one expressly written by the physician.  The 
increase in costs did not go unnoticed by the states.  Subsequent to 1989, all 
states had a law in place allowing pharmacists to dispense the lower cost (i.e., 
generic) alternative medication.  To date most states allow a pharmacist to 
automatically substitute a therapeutically equivalent drug for the one written on the 
prescription (Hellerstein 1998; Rubenstein 2007).  In 2006, an unprecedented 
number of brand named drugs had alternative generics come to market.  The 
brand medications that went generic in 2006 could have resulted in $24.7 billion in 
savings to the nation (Cox, Behm, and Mager 2007). Physician related policies 
have focused on the approach commonly referred to as counter or academic 
detailing.  While pharmaceutical representatives visiting physician offices to 
educate and advocate for the use of a particular branded medication is a common 
phenomenon, what is less known is that states also send out pharmacists to 
advocate and educate on the benefits of generic medications.  In 2008, 
Pennsylvania adopted a counter detailing program to educate physicians within 
the state on the advantages of generic medications (Guadagnino, 2005).  
Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Washington, D.C. have all followed suit in 
hiring academic detailers in an effort to counter the claims of pharmaceutical 
representatives and yield savings for taxpayers.  As expected, the pharmaceutical 
industry rejects the claim that physicians are unable to discern for themselves the 
appropriate medication for their patient (Buntin, 2009).     
Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 58 
 
 In addition to encouraging physicians to prescribe generics, states have 
also adopted programs to encourage the patient to utilize generic medications.  
Vermont’s 2007 drug legislation S.115 created a generic sample voucher program 
providing a financial incentive to encourage patients to obtain generic medication.   
 Although generics have the potential for significant savings, they are not 
always the lowest priced option, presenting a quandary for states that mandate the 
automatic switching from brand to generic medications.  States who only 
reimburse for generic medications when a lower cost brand product was available 
would not realize the expected savings.  Thus, some states have also adopted 
legislation to accommodate such situations where brand name drugs are cheaper 
than generic medications.  In particular, Utah has adopted legislation allowing 
Medicaid to reimburse for the lower cost rather than the generic only.   
Brand Drug Use 
 Brand medications contribute a significant amount to prescription drug 
costs.  As mentioned earlier, brand medications can cost three times as much as 
generic medications.  For all intent and purposes, the difference in price is 
attributed to the initial research and development of new drug entities which is 
often quoted as approximately $800 million per new drug innovation (DiMasi, 
Hansen, and Grabowski 2003; Congressional Budget Office 2006).  While the 
actual R&D costs provide fodder for an interesting debate, states have focused on 
policies to address the cost issue of brand name prescription drugs.   
 Even though states have adopted programs to promote the use of generics, 
states have also adopted policies aimed at the other half of the equation (i.e., 
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brand name medications).  In general, state brand drug policies have coalesced 
with the state generic drug policies.  For example, if states have adopted policies 
to encourage generics, they have also adopted policies to limit the use of brand 
name medications to those situations that are clinically and financially prudent.  
States such as Rhode Island have used financial incentives, higher copayments 
for brand products and lower copayments for generic medications, to encourage 
the use of generics while discouraging the use of brand products.  Similarly, 
Tennessee, legislation Ch. 564 specifies that barring any physician comment of 
medical necessity, patients of a state sponsored plan may receive the branded 
medication if they are willing to pay the entire cost of the branded product, 
whereas the generic products are reimbursed by the state.   
Not all state legislation surrounding branded products is designed to 
mitigate their use.  In fact, some states have adopted policies aimed at providing 
access to branded products.  States like Vermont, have adopted policies allowing 
for the off-label use of prescription drugs for cancer (Act. 139, 2006).  While the 
FDA approves drugs based on evidence presented for specific clinical situations, 
medical experts may find products to be effective for other medical conditions.  For 
example, the use of aspirin as a prophylaxis against cardiovascular disease is 
commonly accepted by physicians as appropriate for diabetes (Stafford, 2008).  In 
an effort to control costs, certain prescription drug coverage plans do not 
reimburse for the off-label usage of medications.  A familiar example of off-label 
use not reimbursed is that of Wellbutrin, a commonly prescribed antidepressant 
medication that is also an effective smoking cessation product.  Without special 
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provisions, individuals not diagnosed with depression would be faced with paying 
more, if not all, of the cost of a Wellbutrin prescription.  However, states like 
Vermont have acted on behalf of their residents to provide prescription drug 
coverage for those products where the empirical evidence is not as strong 
(Stafford, 2008).   
Acquisition policies and influencing factors 
 In the face of economic downturn and rising drug costs, states continue to 
develop prescription drug policies to alleviate this pressure.  As demonstrated in 
the preceding pages, states have a variety of tools at their disposal.  However, it is 
apparent that not all states have reacted uniformly.  Table 4 presents the 
acquisition policies that have been adopted over the analytical time period.  A one 
indicates that the state has adopted at least one acquisition policy over the study 
period.  The sum of acquisition policy types is presented in the last column.  In 
essence the table indicates there has been a variety in the acquisition policies 
employed by states.   
 Figure 1Error! Reference source not found. illustrates prevalence of 
acquisition policies by state.  The map presents the total number of acquisition 
policies adopted over the study period by state.  Not surprisingly, Maine had the 
most policies as it was a forerunner in terms of attempting legislation to place price 
restrictions on pharmaceuticals sold to Maine.  For example, combining the 
information from the map with the information from the table indicates that Maine 
has the most number of policies adopted but did not adopt the most types of 
acquisition policies. 
Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 61 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine which factors influence state 
prescription drug policy.  Each of the aforementioned prescription drug policies 
were designed to assist citizens in acquiring prescription medications.  The price-
sided policies presented indicate that states heavily utilized the financial tools as a 
means to increasing access to prescription medications.  It is my hypothesis that 
acquisition policies were significantly influenced by the demographic indicators 
described in Chapter 2.  The state demographics serve to communicate a need to 
state policy makers.  Thus, states with a greater need for access to prescription 
medications may be more likely to support the aforementioned acquisition policies.  
States facing greater economic challenges may be more likely to adopt the price-
sided strategies described in this chapter.   
 Additionally, a certain degree of clinical and economic knowledge would be 
beneficial in the development of the access policies.  In the case of PDL, Generic 
and brand policies, clinical and economic knowledge is required to compare the 
efficacy and cost-effectiveness of competing products.  An understanding of public 
finance would undoubtedly be of benefit in the construction of the acquisition 
policies.  My supposition is that states with greater legislative professional 
resources would be more likely to adopt these types of access policies.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the state legislatures may be influenced by what other 
states are doing, especially in situations where policies have been successful.  In 
the case of access policies, states reported significant savings, thus potentially 
influencing other states to follow suit.  States facing economic pressures may look 
to the successful policies of other states for solutions.  In addition to the media 
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attention given to rising prescription drug costs, individuals reel from the effects of 
rising costs when they get a prescription filled.  For a majority of Americans 
prescription drug costs is a salient issue.  Drug costs are perceived to be out of 
hand.  Under each of the acquisition policies, states are expanding the role of 
government.  From the 340b to the PDL policies, state legislatures are expanding 
the amount of services provided, the amount of money provided, government 
relationships, or the amount of taxation.  States with a conservative ideology are 
generally opposed to the expansion of government.  Thus, I would expect that 
states with a liberal ideology to be more in favor of such policies. Similarly, states 
with Democratic Party control are more often than not in support of redistributive 
policies.   
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  340B  Bulk 
purchasing 
Drug 
Discount 
MMA Subsidy Importation Tax  PDL  Generic  Brand Total 
AL     1 1 1     1     4 
AK       1       1     2 
AZ     1 1             2 
AR       1 1           2 
CA 1 1 1 1 1 1   1     7 
CO   1 1 1       1 1 1 6 
CT 1   1 1 1 1   1     6 
DE   1 1 1 1 1         5 
DC   1   1 1     1     4 
FL       1 1     1   1 4 
GA     1             1 2 
HI     1 1 1     1 1 1 6 
ID   1   1       1     3 
IL       1     1     1 3 
IN     1 1 1     1   1 5 
IA   1 1 1 1     1     5 
KS       1 1           2 
KY       1 1           2 
LA       1 1   1 1 1 1 6 
ME 1 1 1 1 1           5 
MD   1 1 1 1     1 1   6 
MA 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 9 
MI       1 1           2 
MN       1 1   1 1   1 5 
MS     1 1 1         1 4 
MO   1   1   1   1 1 1 6 
MT   1 1 1 1           4 
NE       1 1           2 
NV       1             1 
NH   1   1       1     3 
NJ 1     1 1     1 1 1 6 
NM       1 1           2 
NY 1   1 1 1           4 
NC   1   1 1 1   1 1   6 
ND 1     1 1     1     4 
OH   1 1 1             3 
OK     1 1           1 3 
OR     1 1 1     1     4 
PA       1 1           2 
RI     1 1 1 1     1 1 6 
SC   1 1 1 1           4 
SD     1 1       1     3 
TN 1     1 1     1 1 1 6 
TX 1   1 1   1     1   5 
UT 1 1 1 1       1 1 1 7 
VT     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
VA 1 1   1 1 1   1 1 1 8 
WA   1   1 1 1 1 1     6 
WV   1 1 1 1     1     5 
WI   1 1 1   1   1     5 
WY       1 1     1     3 
Total 11 20 27 50 36 12 5 30 14 18 223 
Table 4:  States with Prescription Drug Acquisition Policies   
This table identifies which state has adopted at least one of the prescription drug 
policies between 1999-2008 classified as acquisition. 
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Figure 1: Geographic Variation of State Prescription Drug Acquisition Policies  
This graph illustrates the variation in the number of acquisition policies adopted 
between 1999-2008. 
Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 65 
 
CHAPTER 4:  STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG POLICY:  SAFETY 
 
The success or failure of any government in the final 
analysis must be measured by the well-being of its citizens. 
Nothing can be more important to a state than its public health; 
the state's paramount concern should be the health of its people. 
                                                            ~ Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
 
Almost everyone in the U.S. has taken prescription medication at one time 
or another.  On average patients fills 8.2 prescriptions per year in 1999 and 12.4 
prescription per year in 2007, indicating an increase in the utilization  (Express 
Scripts, 1999 & 2008).  For the most part, the utilization of prescriptions is safe.  In 
other words, patients obtain the correct medication without a negative effect on 
their health.  In fact, medication is designed to improve or maintain health status.  
However, there are times when the medication proves harmful.  The damage of 
prescription medication is often associated with adverse drug events (ADEs) or 
medication errors (MEs) (Bates et al. 1995).  Adverse drug events are described 
as injuries resulting from the drug.  ADEs are often a consequence of drug 
interactions or dosing issues.  In addition, ADEs can be explained by serious side 
effects.  For example, the heart attacks associated with Vioxx and rhabdomyolysis 
associated with Baycol were considered adverse drug events (Jameson, 2002; 
Kritz, 2008).  The FDA eventually removed the drugs from the market.  Medication 
errors, on the other hand, are mistakes that occur in the process of ordering or 
delivering prescription medication.  MEs can occur during the ordering, dispensing, 
or administration.  The 2006 Institute of Medicine report, contracted by Center for 
Medicaid and Medicare Services, cite several studies estimating the cost of ADEs 
and MEs range from $8,750 per hospital stay to annual cost of $887 million dollars. 
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States have developed policies to allay the safety concerns associated with 
medications since the 19th century when arsenic, cocaine, and opium were 
commonly used in medical care.  Some of these early proposals, such as those 
suggesting manufacturers place drug ingredients on the label, were designed to 
increase patient safety (Hilts, 2003, 32).  While manufacturers no longer use 
arsenic, cocaine, and opium in the medications, states have continued in their 
development of prescription drug safety policies. 
While policy specifics fluctuate, prescription drug safety concerns in the 21st 
century have resulted in state policies targeting generics, labeling, reuse or 
recycling, regulation of clinical trials, and transmission of electronic prescriptions 
(National Conference of State Legislatures).  For the purpose of this analysis, 
safety policies were defined as policies designed to mitigate ADEs or MEs and 
limited to those policies that were directed at the wellbeing of the individual.   
Similar to the analysis of acquisition policies, I believe that the summative 
categorization of safety policies allows for a more parsimonious analysis of the 
factors influencing prescription drug policies rather than using the four separate 
safety policies.  Table 5 depicts the legislation categorized as safety policies.  
This chapter will discuss the various state prescription drug policies designed to 
enhance prescription drug safety for residents. 
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Name of Safety Prescription Drug Policy 
Generic Drugs 
Electronic prescription orders 
Reuse or recycling of pharmaceuticals 
Disclose or regulate in-state Rx clinical trials 
Table 5:  Safety Prescription Drug Policies 
This table presents that state prescription drug policies included in the Safety 
classification. 
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Policy Descriptions 
Generic Drugs 
 Few argue that generic medications do not provide a cost effective 
alternative to the branded medications; however, criticism has mounted 
surrounding their safety, efficacy, and market advantage.  Although the federal 
government has regulatory authority over food and drugs, state governments have 
adopted or attempted to adopt public policy designed to fill in gaps left by the FDA.  
In particular, opponents of the use of generic anti-epileptic medications indicate 
that these drugs are ineffective and have a lower likelihood of seizure control than 
their branded counterparts.  In most states, pharmaceuticals may automatically be 
switched from a brand product to generic product as long as they are chemically 
equivalent as determined by the FDA (Rubenstein, 2007).  In 2007, several states 
considered policy adoptions limiting the automatic switching from branded anti-
epileptic medications to generic anti-epileptic medications.   
 On the issue of efficacy, some states have adopted policies to educate the 
public on the differences, advantages, and disadvantages of generic medications.  
In 2004, Vermont passed legislation to develop an evidence-based education 
program.  With contributions from various health care professionals (i.e., 
physicians, pharmacists, private insurers, hospitals, pharmacy benefit managers, 
and the drug utilization review boards), the education program provides 
information and education on the therapeutic and cost-effective utilization of 
generic medications.    
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Electronic prescription orders 
 Undoubtedly the most prevalent method of obtaining a prescription involve 
first receiving a written order form from a physician.  The patient then takes the 
prescription form to a pharmacy where the medications are then dispensed.  
Physicians are notorious for their illegible handwriting.  As the name implies, 
electronic prescribing would replace the traditional pen and paper method with 
electronic transmissions of prescriptions.  Electronic prescribing entails the use of 
technology (e.g., computer, personal digital assistant (PDA) by a physician to 
submit prescription orders directly to a pharmacy.  Experts argue that the use of 
electronic prescribing would significantly reduce the number of medical errors 
associated with prescribing (E-health Initiative, 2004).   
State policies were assisted at the federal level where policymakers set 
standards for the use of electronic prescribing (Leavitt, 2007).  State legislative 
initiatives piggybacked on the federal legislation by further encouraging the use of 
electronic prescribing.  In 2008, states like Minnesota required all providers, 
prescribers, and dispensers to “establish and maintain an electronic prescription 
drug program for transmitting prescriptions and prescription-related information 
using electronic media” (Chapter 358, 2008).  While Minnesota required the 
development and maintenance, it did not require the use of the technology.  
Arguably the state, much like the character from the motion picture Field of 
Dreams supported the  “Build it and they will come” approach. In essence, the 
state hope that once the technology was available that health service providers 
would begin using the system.  California went even further to promote electronic 
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prescribing by providing hardware and software to prescribers (Chapter 698, 
2006).10  According to the National ePrescribing Patient Safety Initiative 2006 
Legislation Fact Sheet, twenty-five states had adopted electronic prescribing 
legislation between 2003 and 2006. 
Reuse or recycling of pharmaceuticals  
As mentioned earlier, prescription medications can be quite expensive, 
particularly cancer medications.  Initially prompted by the requests of cancer 
patient families, who saw expensive drugs being flushed down the toilet, states 
adopted policies allowing unused prescription medications to be recycled and 
reused.  In general, these policies allow entities such as hospitals and nursing care 
facilities to donate approved medications to participating pharmacies.  The 
recycled medications are then distributed to the indigent population.  While the 
state policies appear consistent on only allowing unused, sealed, tamper-resistant 
medications to be donated, state policies vary on issues such as who can donate, 
what drugs can be donated, and who will accept the donations.  By regulating 
which entities can donate and what can be donated, the policy attempts to address 
the safety concerns while providing access to much needed expensive 
medications.  Prior to these state policies, donating entities were adhering to the 
federal rules specified in the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1997, whereby the 
FDA prohibited the reselling of pharmaceutical products.  According to the 
American Medical Association, the FDA issued a “non-objection letter” on 
                                                 
10
 Although executive orders are outside the purview of this analysis, Illinois state governor Rod 
Blagojevich established the Division of Patient Safety to promote the use of electronic prescribing 
among all Illinois health care providers by 2011. 
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February 25, 2000 which stated that it would not object to the state recycling 
programs (Wang, 2000).  
Since 1997, 37 states have adopted such recycling policies (National 
Conference of State Legislatures).  Arkansas, Kentucky, California, Maine, 
Michigan, and Minnesota limit donations to health care organizations such as 
hospital or nursing care facilities (National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2009).  In Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Missouri, individuals and 
families, in addition to health care organizations, are allowed to donate unused 
medications.  Oklahoma Representative Darrell Gilbert argued that the reuse and 
recycle prescription drug policies also assist in tackling the environmental 
concerns of the discarded medications contaminating the water supply 
(Thompson, 2005).  While Oklahoma and Iowa report policy success, physicians 
are cautionary about the effects on medication compliance (Wapner, 2009).  Their 
concern rests on the fact that a voluntary donation program may result in 
medication being available for patients this month but not the next (Wapner, 2009).  
In an attempt to address the supply concern of physicians, proponents (e.g., 
pharmacists, health care providers, and volunteers) of the program have explored 
options including public education about what should be done with unused 
medications. 
Disclose or regulate in-state Rx clinical trials 
 Prior to FDA approval of prescription medications, drug manufacturers 
provide empirical evidence of safety and efficacy.  The evidence is gathered 
through an extensive clinical trial process.  Figure 2 illustrates the four phases (i.e., 
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pre-clinical, phase 1, phase 2, and phase 3), which correspond to the degree to 
which the drug is tested on humans.  The drug is tested on animals in the pre-
clinical phase and by phase 3 trials are tested on approximately 3,000 people 
(Food and Drug Administration, 2009).  While the FDA goes through great pains to 
defend its reputation as safeguarding public health, incidents, such as the removal 
of Baycol and Vioxx, have called into question the approval process employed by 
the FDA (Carpenter et al. 2003; Carpenter 2004; Olson 2004).  Therefore, states 
have proposed legislation requiring that clinical trial results be registered with 
health care providers.  However, to date, no state has passed such legislation.  
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Figure 2:  Food and Drug Approval Process*11  
This graphic presents the activities involved at each phase in the FDA approval 
process. 
  
                                                 
11
 Modified from Lipsky and Sharp, 2001. From Idea to Market:  The Drug Approval Process. 
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Chapter Conclusion 
While physicians take the Hippocratic Oath, which espouses the medical 
duties to do no harm, others (e.g., pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies) 
involved in prescription drug delivery make no such proclamation.  To some 
extent, state legislators have taken on this responsibility to advocate for policies 
related to the safety of prescription medications; however, not each state has done 
so nor have states proceeded in a uniform approach.  It is the purpose of this 
dissertation to examine which factors influence whether a state takes up this 
charge or not.  This chapter has presented the various approaches employed by 
states.   
For political, economic, and social reasons, state legislatures have a vested 
interest in the well-being of the citizens they represent.  As discussed in Chapter 3, 
state legislatures have utilized a variety of financial techniques to promote the well-
being of residents related to prescription drugs.  Similarly, state legislatures have 
made use of various public policies to address prescription drug safety concerns 
(Table 6).  Each of the aforementioned prescription drug policies were designed to 
tackle prescription safety problems such as those triggered by ADEs or MEs.   
In each of the safety policies, states attempted to regulate entities involved 
in the delivery of prescription medication with the intent of safeguarding patients. 
As mentioned earlier, all state prescription drug policy may at the most basic level 
appears as though it is attempting to regulate access in one form or another.  
However, the prescription drug policies classified as safety are different from those 
listed in acquisition and distribution policy category based on the substantive 
Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 75 
 
difference in the primary objective.  The safety policies as they are defined here 
target the well-being of citizens.   
Figure 3 illustrates the geographic distribution of prescription drug safety 
policies.  Unlike acquisition policies, where every state had adopted at least one 
policy, not all states have adopted a safety policy.  Similar to acquisition policies; 
however, Maine had the most policies adopted. 
I hypothesize those demographic factors indicating prescription drug need 
influence the adoption of safety policies.  Similar to the acquisition policies, state 
demographics serve to communicate a need to state policy makers.  It is my 
supposition that safety policies were significantly influenced by the demographic 
indicators described in Chapter 2.  In the same way that state demographics serve 
to communicate need to state policy makers, state demographics serve as 
indicators of potential safety risks associated with prescription medications.  States 
with an older, poorer, less educated and more sickly population may be more likely 
to adopt the regulatory policies described in this chapter.    
Throughout the history of prescription drug regulation in the United States, 
issue saliency has proved a major impetus for government intervention.  In the 
case of reuse or recycling of prescription medications, the citizen demands to 
make sure the reuse of medication was implemented safety prompted response 
from legislators.  Although the safety issues were different, public concern was the 
impetus for public action.  Hence, issue salience may be a stronger predictor on 
safety policies than that of financial policies.  According to one survey of 
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Americans, 51% indicated they “closely followed” news reports related to the 
Institute of Medicine report on the medical errors in hospitals.   
In addition to demographics, the legislative professionalism within a state 
may influence adoption of prescription drug safety policies.  In the case of generic 
drug policies, clinical and regulatory knowledge is required to assess the gaps in 
FDA regulation and the safety threats of prescription medications.  An 
understanding of health information technology would undoubtedly be of benefit in 
the construction of the electronic prescription policies.  My hypothesis is that states 
with greater legislative professional resources would be more likely to adopt these 
types of safety policies.   
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the state legislatures may be influenced by 
what other states are doing especially in situations where policies have been 
successful.  Unlike acquisition policies where the reported significant savings may 
influence other states to follow suit in adopting such policies, safety policies may 
be influenced by states that have successfully reduced the incidence of ADEs or 
MEs. 
Under each of the safety policies, state governments are projecting 
themselves into the business that is prescription medications.  From how 
prescriptions are written to the reuse of prescription medications, states’ 
legislatures are introducing policies to regulate the dispensing of prescription 
medications.  States with a conservative ideology are generally opposed to the 
intrusion of government into the market.  Thus, I would expect that states with a 
liberal ideology would be more in favor of such policies.   
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 Generic  Electronic Rx Clinical Trials Reuse Total by State 
AL         0 
AK     0 
AZ    1 1 
AR  1  1 2 
CA    1 1 
CO 1 1  1 3 
CT     0 
DE     0 
DC     0 
FL  1  1 2 
GA    1 1 
HI 1   1 2 
ID  1  1 2 
IL  1   1 
IN  1 1  2 
IA    1 1 
KS    1 1 
KY  1  1 2 
LA 1 1  1 3 
ME  1   1 
MD 1   1 2 
MA 1  1 1 3 
MI     0 
MN  1  1 2 
MS    1 1 
MO 1 1   2 
MT     0 
NE     0 
NV    1 1 
NH    1 1 
NJ 1    1 
NM    1 1 
NY     0 
NC 1  1 1 3 
ND     0 
OH     0 
OK    1 1 
OR     0 
PA    1 1 
RI 1   1 2 
SC  1   1 
SD  1  1 2 
TN 1 1  1 3 
TX 1   1 2 
UT 1    1 
VT 1  1 1 3 
VA 1 1   2 
WA     0 
WV    1 1 
WI     0 
WY    1 1 
Total 14 15 4 29 62 
Table 6:  States with Safety Prescription Drug Policies 
This table presents the state prescription drug policies adopted by each state 
between 1999-2008.  One indicates the state adopted at least one prescription 
drug policy over the analytical period.   
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Figure 3:  Geographic Variation of State Prescription Drug Safety Policies  
This map illustrates the total number of prescription drug safety policies adopted 
between 1999-2008.   
Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 79 
 
CHAPTER 5:  STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG POLICY:  DISTRIBUTION 
 
“Government is a trust, and the officers of the government are 
trustees, and both the trust and trustees are created for the benefit of 
the people” – Henry Clay (1829) 
  
 While political science scholars explore the concept of public trust and its 
impact on society, legislators continue to act as trustees in policymaking for the 
interest of citizens (Damico, Conway, and Damico 2000).  Public concern over 
unfair business practices have prompted states to develop policies related to the 
distribution of prescription medications.  In particular, public trepidation regarding 
the effect of business practices on the use, access, and quality of prescription 
medications have prompted state action.  It is the state prescription drug policies 
designed to regulate distribution organizations that is the focus of this chapter.  
 In 2005, 3.6 billion prescription medications were purchased in the United 
States (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007).  Patients were able to secure these 
medications through a myriad of sources including retail pharmacies, mail-order 
pharmacies, internet pharmacies, hospitals, and clinics.  Figure 4 illustrates the 
various prescription drug distribution channels and the distribution hierarchy.  State 
lawmakers have adopted a number of prescription drug policies to regulate retail 
pharmacies mail-order pharmacies, internet pharmacies, hospitals, and clinics 
(Table 7).   
 Although distribution policies are similar to safety policies in that they are 
both regulatory, it is my supposition that safety and distribution policies differ in 
their regulatory objectives, thus warranting separate chapters.  Specifically, safety 
policies attempt to regulate with the objective of citizen wellbeing, whereas 
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distribution policies are designed to police those entities responsible for distribution 
of prescription medications with the objective of mitigating unfair business 
practices.  The delineation between safety and distribution policies is based on the 
hypothesis that different factors will influence policy with patient safety objectives 
compared to those with more policing objectives.     
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Figure 4:  Prescription Drug Distribution Channel 
This graphic presents the relationship between pharmaceutical manufacturer and 
pharmaceutical distributors.   
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Name of Distribution Prescription Drug Policies 
Pharmaceutical marketing and advertising 
Regulate retail pharmacies 
Regulate mail-order pharmacies 
Regulate internet pharmacies 
Regulate wholesalers 
Regulate of PBM 
Table 7:  State Prescription Drug Distribution Policies 
This table lists the prescription drug policies classified as distribution. 
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Pharmaceutical marketing and advertising 
There are two diametrically opposed positions when it comes to the 
marketing and advertising of pharmaceuticals.  On one side is the position that 
marketing and advertising provide a public service by informing patients and 
physicians about disease and treatment options (Woloshin, et al, 2001).  On the 
other side is the position that marketing and advertising undermine the patient and 
physician relationship, increase costs, and result in unnecessary demand for 
pharmaceuticals (Rosenthal et al. 2002; Rosenau, Lal, and Glasser, 2009).  IMS, 
the leading expert on pharmaceutical related data, estimated that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers spent over $27 billion in 2004 on product marketing and advertising 
(IMS Health, 2005).  While the marketing and advertising activities of prescription 
manufacturers may provide a public service, the fact remains that concern over the 
effect of the perceived unfair business practices have sparked state legislatures to 
address the issue.  In particular, states have focused on the physician 
communications, leaving regulation of print and television media to the federal 
government12.     
Historically, pharmaceutical manufacturers would promote their products 
through physician detailing which refers to the use of pharmaceutical 
representatives to educate the physician on a given pharmaceutical product.  
Anyone visiting a doctor’s office has undoubtedly seen the barrage of 
                                                 
12
 In 1997, the FDA released guidelines related to pharmaceutical advertising that increased the usage of 
direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising.  While, prior to 1997, manufacturers were allowed to engage in 
direct-to-consumer advertising, the requirement to disclose side-effects, effectiveness, and 
contraindications was somewhat ambiguous and difficult to interpret.  The 1997 guidelines indicated that 
disclosure and adequate provision requirements could be met if the DTC mentioned that additional 
information could be obtained from their doctor, a telephone number or website. 
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pharmaceutical representatives entering the office with information (e.g., 
pamphlets or study results) and samples.  Physicians indicate that they trust the 
information provided by pharmaceutical representatives and that the interactions 
with pharmaceutical representatives are beneficial to patient care (Fischer, et al., 
2009). However, pharmaceutical representatives might bring gifts in addition to the 
educational information and samples.  The gifts may range from low value items 
such as pens and memo pads to expensive gifts such as travel to conferences in 
exotic locations.  It is the concern that gift giving will influence physician prescribing 
that has triggered public action.  However, little evidence exists to substantiate the 
claim that gifts are harmful to patient care (Huddle, 2008).   
One way states have attempted to address the problem is to reduce the 
financial incentives paid to service providers.  For example, Arizona proposed 
legislation requiring manufacturers to fully disclose prescription marketing costs 
and prohibiting gifts of more than $50 made to physicians (Arizona HB2562, 2008).  
New York legislators have taken it one step further and attempted to require 
pharmaceutical drug manufacturers and wholesalers to report annually and 
publicly disclose contributions made to health care prescribing practitioners when 
they exceed a specific value (New York S2971, A 7468a, 2008).   
In addition to financial gifts, pharmaceutical manufacturers also provide 
drug related information to those who prescribe prescription medications.  States 
have attempted to tackle the issue of misleading information.  Washington, D.C. 
passed the SafeRx Amendment Act in 2008 regulating pharmaceutical 
representatives and prohibiting them from engaging in deceptive or misleading 
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marketing (Council of the District of Columbia D.C. Official Code § 1-206.02(c)(1), 
2008).  Maine passed legislation prohibiting the inappropriate use of marketing 
messages to prescribers via electronic prescribing software (Maine Public Law 
Chapter 362, 2007).   
Regulation of Retail Pharmacies 
The bulk of prescription medications are dispensed via retail pharmacies.  
In fact, close to 3 billion prescriptions were filled in chain and independent retail 
pharmacies in 2008 (IMS Health, 2009).  The retail pharmacies include companies 
most Americans are familiar with such as Walgreens, CVS, and Target, but they 
also include independent pharmacies such as Happy Harry’s.  For each state in 
which the pharmacy operates, the pharmacy must meet the states’ individual rules 
and regulations governing pharmacy practice.  For example, Walgreens must 
adhere to the state licensing and dispensing regulations for the 50 states in which 
it operates a pharmacy (Walgreens, 2009).  The laws are designed to ensure that 
pharmacies are practicing an acceptable standard of care and to avoid 
incompetent or dangerous acts by pharmacies or pharmacists.   
With so much at stake in terms of potential earnings and health care 
delivery, states have adopted policies to address the issue of unfair business 
practices.  Unfair business practices often include issues of market advantage.  
Market advantage can be described as those situations which promote a 
competitive advantage of one product over another.  States are addressing what 
might be construed as unfair business involving the nation’s largest retailer.  In 
2006, Wal-Mart announced its $4 generic program which charges consumers $4 
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for a 30-day supply of selected medication.  Several states (i.e., California, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming) proposed legislation aimed at “predatory pricing.”  The policies prohibit 
retailers from selling products below market prices.  Unfortunately, the state policy 
has had unintended consequences.  In particular, consumers now pay more for 14 
generic drugs purchased at Target and about 55 generic drugs purchased at Wal-
Mart (National Conference of State Legislatures).  Additionally, industry experts 
argue that the $4 generic effect on patients overall was negligible for most of 
patients but has benefited those poor and uninsured patients the most.   
Regulate Mail-Order pharmacies 
 Second only to retail pharmacies, mail-order pharmacies account for 16% 
($101 billion) of the prescription drug sales in the U.S. (IMS Health, 2008).  Mail-
order pharmacies provide both convenience and cost saving opportunities for 
patients.  For example, individuals who live in remote locations can secure 
prescription medications from a mail-order pharmacy.  Additionally, their costs are 
substantially lower as a result of volume discount on medications from 
manufacturers, use of automated prescription filling technology, and filling more 
than one month supply of medication to patients (Enright, 1987; Wertheimer, 
Andrews, 1995).  Patients typically benefit financially from the lower distribution 
and dispensing fees by paying for two months supply while receiving a three 
month supply of medicine.  States have seen the financial benefits offered by mail-
order pharmacies and have thus put in place legislation to encourage their use.  
For example, states like Maine and Colorado adopted legislation to allow Medicaid 
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recipients to use mail-order pharmacy (Chapter 237, 2008).  In addition, Maryland 
established a $20 maximum copayment amount for those enrolled in the State 
Prescription Drug Plan (Chapter 28, 2006). 
However, not all states are so receptive to the use of mail-order 
pharmacies.  Historically, mail-order pharmacies were in competition with retail 
pharmacies.  Contrary to retail allegations of the dangers associated with mail-
order pharmacies, a study authorized under the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage 
Act of 1988, found no evidence suggesting that the quality of medications or care 
was inadequate.  Additionally, scholars found that mail order customers were more 
satisfied with the pharmacy services than those of retail pharmacies (Johnson, et 
al. 1997).  Nonetheless, retail pharmacies began to lobby states in an effort to 
impede the use of mail order pharmacies.  As such, states such as Wisconsin 
have passed legislation requiring that all mail order pharmacies be licensed by the 
State Pharmacy Examining Board (Act 242, 2006).  While similar to the 
requirement that retail pharmacies be licensed in the state in which they are 
operating a pharmacy, this legislation would require mail order pharmacies to be 
licensed in states where they will be mailing prescription medications.  For 
example, if a mail-order pharmacy is physically located in Arizona but mails 
prescriptions to Wisconsin, the pharmacy must meet the licensing and regulation 
required by Wisconsin.  Additionally, states have adopted legislation to protect the 
financial interests of state owned and operated pharmacies.  For example, Maine 
has required that the all MaineCare beneficiaries have a local retail option to the 
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out-of-state mail order options.  However, in Michigan legislation was adopted to 
remove legal barriers to mail-order companies operating in the state. 
Regulate Internet Pharmacies 
 Use of the internet to purchase products has permeated the U.S.  Thus, it 
should be no surprise that citizens have turned to the internet to purchase 
prescription medications.  As with other products, the use of the internet has 
advantages of savings and convenience and disadvantages surrounding privacy, 
safety, and security.  However, the fact that prescription medications are digested 
into the body, the safety concerns are somewhat different and potentially more 
dangerous than other internet purchases.  While the Federal Food Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) regulates that a valid prescription must accompany all 
pharmacy dispensed medications, there are “rogue sites.”  According to the FDA, 
these rogue websites engage in illegal business practices such as selling 
counterfeit medications or dispensing without a valid prescription (Food and Drug 
Administration, 2001).  The National Board of Pharmacies working with federal, 
state, consumers, and internet pharmacies developed the Verified Internet 
Pharmacy Practice Sites (VIPPS).  In general, the VIPPS program is similar to a 
Good Housekeeping Award.  Internet pharmacies who apply for VIPPS 
accreditation must meet state licensing requirements and the 18-point criteria 
based on quality, patient confidentiality, and pharmacy practice.  Those meeting 
the requirement will receive VIPPS certification which can be placed on the 
website as an indicator to patients of the quality and status of the internet site.  
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Since 2003, states have adopted strategies to regulate this industry 
(National Conference of State Legislatures 2009).  Pharmacies not only serve as 
dispensing centers but also provide consultative services to patients.  It is due to 
the concern for patient safety that states such as New Hampshire, Arkansas, 
Idaho, and Louisiana, have adopted legislation requiring that a relationship 
between licensed practitioner and patient be established prior to transaction.  
Wisconsin requires that the pharmacy be licensed in the state by the State 
Pharmacy Examining Board (Act 242, 2006).  In addition to regulating the 
pharmacies, Texas has created legislation to create a public awareness campaign 
to educate the public about the potential dangers of online pharmacies.   
Regulate Wholesalers 
 Closely associated to the regulation of internet pharmacies is the states’ 
desire to regulate pharmaceutical wholesalers.  In the case of prescription drugs, 
the term wholesaler is not limited to manufacturer.  Wholesalers are those entities 
that purchase directly from the manufacturer for resale to pharmacies and may 
include warehouses, manufacturers or repackagers (Frank, 2001).  Prompted by 
both safety and unfair business practice concerns over prescription drug 
authentication, states are adopting legislation requiring wholesalers to ascertain 
the pedigree of prescription medications (Laven, 2006).  In addition to the pedigree 
requirement, states like Colorado require wholesalers to complete a criminal 
history background check.   
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Regulation of Pharmacy Benefit Managers  
In addition to pharmaceutical manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers, 
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) play a role in the delivery of prescription 
drugs.  In general, PBMs act in a fashion similar to managed care organizations, 
only without assuming the financial risk.  While initially PBMs served primarily as 
claims processing services, PBMs expanded beyond claims processing to include 
formulary management, manufacturer rebate contracting, mail-order pharmacy, 
drug utilization review, medication compliance, and disease management 
programs.  Employers would hire PBMs, as claims processors, to aggregate 
prescription drug claims from pharmacies, collect payment from the employer, and 
pay the pharmacy for those prescription drugs dispensed.  In exchange for 
providing this administrative function, PBMs would receive an administrative fee or 
the difference between the two (i.e., spread).  Figure 5 depicts the financial 
relationships between PBM, pharmacy and employers associated with claims 
processing.  Beyond their claims processing role, PBMs serve as consultants in 
drug utilization review, medication compliance, and disease management 
programs.  In their consultant role, PBMs take into account the clinical and 
economic considerations to achieve the employers’ goal of effective and efficient 
use of financial resources allocated for prescription drugs.   
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Figure 5:  Illustration of PBM financial relationships between employer and 
pharmacy. 
This graphic not only presents the roles of a PBM but also the relationship to those 
entities being paid by PBMs and those entities paying PBMs.  The components 
included in the price billed by the PBM and the price paid by the PBM is identified 
in the bottom two boxes.  
  
PBM 
 Administers prescription drug benefits for employers 
 Engages pharmacies to dispense employee prescriptions  
 Negotiates prices to pay pharmacy and price to bill client for 
medication 
PBM bills Employer 
 Cost of drug 
 Dispensing Fee 
 Tax 
 Administrative 
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PBM pays Pharmacy 
 Cost of drug 
 Dispensing fee 
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($ to 
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Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 92 
 
 
Undoubtedly PBMs provide a benefit in terms of cost savings; however, 
their financial arrangements with pharmaceutical manufacturers have come under 
scrutiny (Rentmeester and Garis, 2008).  Through legislation, state legislatures 
have attempted to increase transparency into the financial arrangements of PBMs.  
Maryland increased the financial disclosure requirement of PBMs.  Similarly, 
Louisiana’s Pharmacy Patient Protection Act sought to increase disclosure by 
requiring PBMs to be licensed with the Department of Health and Hospitals and 
disclose financial affiliation with related pharmacy business.  As expected, retail 
pharmacies were opposed to PBMs since most PBMs operate mail-order 
pharmacies.  States such as Connecticut required PBMs to annually register with 
the state and obtain surety bond insurance.   
Chapter Conclusion 
As discussed in Chapter 3, state legislatures have utilized a variety of 
financial techniques to promote the well-being of residents related to prescription 
drugs.  Similarly, state legislatures have made use of various public policies to 
address prescription drug unfair business practices concerns.  Table 6. indicates 
that only two states have adopted all four types of distribution policies, whereas, 
sixteen (30%) of states have adopted only one type of distribution policy.  Figure 6 
illustrates that once again, Maine has the most policies adopted.  Additionally, 
there are many states who have failed to adopt any prescription drug policies to 
regulate those entities that distribute prescription medications. 
For more than 200 years, the U.S. has embraced classical economics.  
During that time, the U.S. has largely applied the market self-regulation approach.  
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In essence, there is great faith in the market to correct itself when needed.  In the 
case of prescription drugs, government has played a narrow role.  Unlike the 
United Kingdom or Canada, there are no price controls, no national drug formulary 
and no universsal coverage of prescription drugs.  It is the historic void of 
governmental involvement that heightens the intrigue over state actions.  Why 
would states adopt policies seemingly counter to the underlying economic 
principles so prevalent in the U.S. DNA?  What are the factors that would influence 
state policy adoption regulating prescription drug entities?  It is the focus of this 
dissertation to explore such factors and their influence on prescription drug policy 
adoption.   
John Kingdon suggests that problems that violate our societal values are 
likely to be construed as a problem needing attention (2003, 198).  The strongest 
of those values include equity, individual responsibility, and faith in market 
solutions.  In essence, those situations that are counter to the belief of fairness and 
equity might result in increased public concern to the level of government action.  
In the case of distribution policies, business actions perceived as unjust or 
providing unfair advantages to one group over another might result in adoption of 
public policy.  However, undoubtedly there are situations when unfair business 
practices are at play yet no adoption of public policy adoption transpires.  Thus, I 
hypothesize that the greater the issue salience, the greater the number of states 
adopting policies to address the issue of distribution.   
Additionally, the state policies described in this chapter attempt to regulate 
entities within a powerful industry.  The entities within this industry are represented 
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by one of the most influential interest groups in the nation.  Thus, one would 
expect reasonable resistance to government regulation within this industry.  Given 
the strength and influence of the pharmaceutical industry, it is a wonder any state 
policies attempting to regulate distribution would get adopted.  While theory 
suggests that public concern and interest groups may influence the adoption of 
distributive policies, state legislators also answer to themselves and their political 
party.  Thus to the extent that the policy proposals are consistent with the political 
ideology and the platform of the political party in control, one would expect 
government adoption of distribution policies.  From how pharmaceutical 
representatives interact with physicians to the financial disclosure of PBMs, states’ 
legislatures are introducing policies to regulate the dispensing of prescription 
medications.  States with a conservative ideology are generally opposed to the 
intrusion of government into the market.  Thus, I would expect that states with a 
liberal ideology to be more in favor of such policies. 
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  Pharmaceutical 
marketing and 
advertising 
Retail  Mail-order Internet Wholesalers PBM Total by State 
AL             0 
AK             0 
AZ       1 1   2 
AR     1 1 1   3 
CA 1     1 1 1 4 
CO       1 1   2 
CT           1 1 
DE           1 1 
DC             0 
FL       1 1 1 3 
GA       1 1   2 
HI       1   1 2 
ID       1 1 1 3 
IL         1   1 
IN             0 
IA       1 1   2 
KS       1   1 2 
KY   1   1     2 
LA 1     1   1 3 
ME 1           1 
MD     1 1 1 1 4 
MA     1 1   1 3 
MI     1       1 
MN       1     1 
MS       1     1 
MO           1 1 
MT         1 1 2 
NE             0 
NV       1 1 1 3 
NH     1 1     2 
NJ           1 1 
NM       1     1 
NY           1 1 
NC       1 1   2 
ND             0 
OH             0 
OK       1 1   2 
OR           1 1 
PA       1     1 
RI       1     1 
SC             0 
SD       1 1 1 3 
TN     1 1   1 3 
TX       1 1   2 
UT             0 
VT       1 1   2 
VA           1 1 
WA           1 1 
WV     1 1 1   3 
WI             0 
WY       1 1   2 
Total 3 1 7 29 19 20 79 
Table 8:  States with Distribution Prescription Drug Policies 
This table presents the state prescription drug policies adopted by each state 
between 1999-2008.  One indicates the state adopted at least one prescription 
drug policy over the analytical period 
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Figure 6:  Geographic Variation of State Prescription Drug Distribution Policies 
This map illustrates the total number of prescription drug distribution policies 
adopted between 1999-2008. 
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CHAPTER 6:  STUDY DATA AND METHODS 
 
“If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called 
research, would it?”  -Albert Einstein 
  
 While prescription medications have become an integral part of health care 
services, acquisition, safety, and distribution surrounding these products have 
given rise to public concern.  As discussed in the previous chapters, states have 
been innovative in adopting a myriad of public policies increasing access, ensuring 
safety, and safeguarding against unfair business practices.  However, not all states 
have adopted prescription drug policies.  Thus, the question still remains as to 
which factors affect whether or not a state adopts prescription drug policy.   
 The focus of this chapter is to present the methodological approach used to 
tackle the research question (i.e., what factors influence prescription drug policy?).  
First, a brief description of the data sources is presented.  Second, covariate 
selection with specific research questions in terms of hypotheses is presented.  
Included in the third section is a discussion on the methodological approach to 
categorization of the prescription drug policies.  Lastly, I illustrate the analytical 
models.   
Data Source 
 This is a retrospective study comprised of a pooled cross-sectional time 
series using data from 1999 through 2008 where each case represents a state-
year.  Both practical and theoretical reasons guided the selection of this time 
period.  From a theoretical standpoint the last ten years has been the most active 
in terms of prescription drug policy.  The increased use, changes in approval 
process, and rising drug costs have put prescription medications on the public 
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agenda.  From a practical standpoint, the National Conference for State 
Legislatures (NCSL) compiled data on prescription drug policy over the last ten 
years.  According to their website, NCSL obtains information through 50 state 
website searches and through services provided via StateNet.13  The data 
contained one observation for each state year, resulting in 500 observations over 
the ten year time period.  In addition to the NCSL data, state legislative websites 
were reviewed to obtain legislative details (e.g., wording, date of approval, and 
sponsor).  
 Data from a variety of secondary data sources were used to obtain predictor 
variables.  Appendix 1 is the full list of the data sources used in the analysis.  The 
following sections provide detailed descriptions of the predictor and dependent 
variables used in the analysis.  Data collection, time periods, and any data 
limitations data are also discussed. 
Prescription Drug Policy Predictor Variables 
 Predictor variable identification and selection was based on research 
discussed in Chapter 2 (Walker, 1969; Mohr, 1969; Gray, 1973; Berry and Berry, 
1990; Case, Hines, and Rosen, 1993; Mintrom, 1997; Berry and Baybeck, 2005; 
Gray, Lowery, and Godwin, 2007; Miller, 2005).  The research suggests that state 
policy adoption is affected by the population composition, resource capacity, 
extraneous factors, and political and ideological influences.  The twelve predictor 
variables selected for analysis include elderly, poverty, health status, urbanization, 
education, state wealth, and interest group activity, legislative professionalism, 
                                                 
13
 StateNet is a legislative and regulatory service provider.  Information concerning StateNet can be found 
at www.statenet.com. 
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neighboring state policies, state ideology, political party control, and issue saliency.  
Table 2 depicts the covariates and the hypothesized effect on state prescription 
drug policy.   
Population Composition – In theory, legislators are elected to represent the will 
of the people.  Thus, one would expect demographics to matter.  Specifically 
related to prescription drug policy, one would expect states with a disproportionate 
share of elderly, poor, sick, lesser educated, or those living in rural areas to 
influence policy adoption.  The following section briefly presents the rationale for 
factor selection and the method of operationalization for variables related to the 
states’ population:         
 State population over the age of 65:  As discussed in Chapter 2, states with 
a disproportionate share of citizens over the age of 65 may have a greater need for 
pharmaceuticals.  Research suggests a positive relationship between age and the 
use of prescription medications suggesting the greater the proportion of elderly 
individuals the greater the need for and utilization of prescription medications.  
Thus, lawmakers representing states with a greater percentage of elderly may be 
particularly concerned with the issues of pharmaceutical access and safety.  
However, the linkage between the percentages of those citizens over 65 and 
distribution policy becomes more difficult to establish.  As discussed in Chapter 5, 
distribution policies are regulatory in nature and are aimed at the entities involved 
in distribution of prescription medications.  One would not expect the adoption of 
distribution policies to be influenced by the percentage of elderly within a state.  
Rather for distribution policies, age may be proxy for public opinion.   
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 Using U.S. Bureau of Census data from 1999 to 2008, age is 
operationalized as the percent of population age 65 and older.  Figure 7 is a 
graphical presentation of the percentage of a state’s population that is 65 years of 
age or older.  All but three states had more than 10% of their population over the 
age of 65.   
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Figure 7:  Histogram of State Population - Over 65 
This graph presents the percentage of a state’s population that is over the age of 
65 in 2008. 
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 State population in poverty:  In general, the ability to pay for prescription 
medications has become more difficult as the price of prescription medications has 
continued to increase faster than the rate of inflation.  Undoubtedly, those 
individuals with lower income will face more difficulty in paying for needed 
medications.  As discussed in Chapter 2, legislators rely on indicators to ascertain 
which policies to address.  Thus, a disproportionate share of the population in 
poverty may serve as an indicator to legislators of need for prescription 
medications.   Lawmakers representing states with a greater proportion of citizens 
in poverty may be particularly concerned with the issues of pharmaceutical access 
and safety.  However, one would not expect adoption of pharmaceutical 
distribution policies, discussed in Chapter 5, to be affected by an unequal 
representation of poverty.  The distribution policies are aimed at regulating the 
distribution of prescriptions, regardless of economic status.  Thus, I hypothesize 
that the greater the percentage of residents below the poverty level the greater the 
likelihood of prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition and safety but not those 
policies aimed at distribution.  Poverty was operationalized as the percentage of 
individuals at the 100% Federal Poverty Level according to the U.S. Bureau of 
Census.  Census data from 1999 to 2008 was downloaded from the U.S. Bureau 
of the Census website.  Undoubtedly, the poverty rates have changed over the 
study period.  Figure 8 is a histogram illustrating the number of state and their 
percentage of a state’s population considered to be in poverty in 2008.   
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Figure 8:  Percent of State Population below FPL 
This graph illustrates the distribution of proportion of a state’s population that are 
below the federal poverty level in 2008. 
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Lesser educated population:  Similar to previously mentioned factors, the 
educational attainment of the population may serve as an indicator to legislator.  In 
essence, states with a greater proportion of lesser educated citizens may signal a 
need for greater need for pharmaceuticals.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, education 
is positively associated with good health.  Thus, the supposition remains that 
states with a less educated population may have worse health and thus have 
greater need for pharmaceuticals and a greater need of protection against any 
dangers and injustice associated with prescription medications.  Thus, I 
hypothesize that states with a greater proportion of citizens with at least a 
bachelor’s degree the fewer prescription drug policies. 
Educational attainment of the states’ population was operationalized as the 
percent of the population over the age of 25 with a bachelor’s degree (Wright, 
Erikson, and McIver, 1987).  Educational attainment data was obtained from the 
U.S. Census Bureau website.  Figure 9 presents the distribution of states and their 
proportion of population that have a bachelor’s degree.  In 2008, only Colorado, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Maryland have greater than 35% of the 
population with a bachelor’s degree. 
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Figure 9:  Histogram of State Proportion with Bachelor's Degree 
This histogram indicates proportion of a state’s population in 2008 with a bachelors 
degree ranges from the mid-teens to more than thirty percent.  
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Urban population: Similar to the effect that a state with a disproportionate 
share of elderly, poor, and less educated population may have on the need of 
pharmaceuticals, states with greater portion of citizens residing in rural areas may 
serve as an indicator of need.  As discussed in Chapter 2, rural areas are 
characteristically older, sicker, and poorer and perhaps have a greater need of 
access to prescription medications.  The distribution policies discussed in Chapter 
5 may be of greater concern for rural states than for those with greater 
urbanization.  For individuals in rural areas, the internet and mail-order pharmacies 
may serve as a cost-effective and convenient means to needed medications.  
Additionally, more retail pharmacies are located within urban areas than rural 
areas.  Undoubtedly, the retail pharmacies do not embrace regulatory policies; 
consequently, states with larger urban areas may face greater resistance to 
distribution policies.  Thus, state legislatures of a more rural state may have a 
greater number of acquisition, safety, and distribution prescription drug policies.   
Consistent with the research of Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1987), 
urbanization was operationalized as the percent of the population residing in the 
State Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA).  Data on percent of state population 
living in urban areas was downloaded from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 2009 
Statistical Abstracts website.   
Health Status:  As mentioned in Chapter 2, health status serves as an 
indicator of citizen need for prescription medications.  Consistent with other 
factors selected for this analysis, states with a disproportionate population in poor 
health may have a greater need for pharmaceuticals.  The essence of the 
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argument is based on the supposition that a healthier population would have less 
need for prescription medications.  The diminished need may manifest itself into 
fewer prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition, safety, or distribution.   
While individual health has been measured by the self-reported health status 
or the physician-reported number of chronic conditions, both focus on quantifying 
the health of the individual and are often used as a proxy for demand of services.    
In this analysis, health status is based on the National Center for Chronic 
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS).14  The BRFSS data allows for the examination of self-reported 
health status representing the state’s population across the study time period.  
States with a lower percentage of respondents within a state who responded that 
they are in “Good or Better” health may serve to indicate need of health services 
such as prescription medication.    
Resource Capacity – In theory, state legislators are responsible for carrying out 
the will of the people; however, they must act within the confines of their state.  In 
particular, state legislators are limited by financial resources and staffing with 
regard to what they can get done.  Limited financial resources may restrict policy 
options and limited staffing available may reduce the amount of time spent on 
policy options.  Thus, the supposition remains that the more resources available, 
both in terms of money and staff, the more likely legislators to adopt public policy.  
                                                 
14
 According to the CDC website the BRFSS is “The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) 
is the world’s largest, on-going telephone health survey system, tracking health conditions and risk 
behaviors in the United States yearly since 1984.”  Telephone survey respondents are asked “Would you 
say that, in general, your health is Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair or Poor.” 
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The following section briefly presents the rationale for factor selection and the 
method of operationalization for variables related to the states’ resource capacity. 
Financial Capacity:  A state’s financial capacity may influence its willingness 
to adopt prescription drug policies.  States with fewer dollars available may be 
more inclined to utilize the financial based policies discussed in Chapter 3 to 
address the access issue than states with greater resources.  Safety and 
distribution policies which attempt to regulate the actions do not lend to the 
supposition that the wealth of a state would be a factor.  In other words, one would 
not necessarily expect that a wealthy state is more likely to regulate the distribution 
of prescription medications, whereas the supposition remains that states with more 
money available may be more likely to adopt prescription drug policies to assist 
their population.   
In this analysis, state financial capacity will be calculated as a ratio by taking 
the total state revenue minus the total state spending divided by total spending 
(Berry and Berry, 1990, 401).  Thus for states where the total expenditure is less 
than total revenue, one would see a positive number.  However, in cases where 
the state has spent more than was collected, one would see a negative number.  
The larger the gap between what was spent and what was collected the larger the 
ratio.  As expected states differ not only in size but in budget, thus calculating 
financial capacity in such a manner allows for a comparable measure across 
states.  The expenditure and revenue data was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business.  The application of the formula 
below to calculate financial capacity will allow for the analysis of slack resources 
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on the adoption of state prescription drug policy.  Below is the formula used to 
calculate the financial capacity of a state.   
 
 
Financial capacity = total state revenue – total state spending 
                   total state spending 
 
  
Legislative Professionalism:  According to Christopher Mooney (1985, 48) 
legislative professionalism “generally refers to the enhancement of the 
legislature's capacity to perform its role in the policy-making process with an 
expertise, seriousness, and effort comparable to other actors in that process.”  
Prescription drug policy can be quite complicated, thus states with greater capacity 
in terms of expertise or staffing may be better suited to develop prescription drug 
policy, particularly those aimed at safety or distribution.   
Research suggests a number of ways in which to operationalize legislative 
professionalism including state legislative compensation, days in session, 
operating budget per legislator, and the number of staff members per legislator 
(King, 2000; Grossback and Peterson, 2004; Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman, 
2000, Owings and Borck 2000).  Consistent with King (2000) and Owings and 
Borck (2000) legislative professionalism is designed to measure the capacity of 
state legislators and one such way is by calculation of ratio of staff to legislator.  As 
previously mentioned states differ not only in physical size but in representation, 
thus calculating legislative professionalism in terms of staffing per legislator 
allows for a comparable measure across states. Below is the formula used to 
calculate legislative professionalism.   
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Legislative Professionalism =   # of staff  
# of state legislators 
 
Extraneous Influence – In addition to considering who lives in the state and the 
resources available, state legislators may also be influenced by the actions or 
activities that occur outside of their state.  With regard to prescription drug policy, 
which can be complex and time consuming, state legislators may look to 
neighboring states for ideas on successful policies.  The following section briefly 
presents the rationale for including neighboring states as a factor and the method 
of operationalizing the influence of neighboring states’. 
Neighboring State Policy Adoption:  In the case of neighboring state 
influence, the adage “No man is an island” seems to apply.  Whether motivated 
by constraints or competitive federalism, as discussed in Chapter 2, state 
legislators may look to neighboring states for public policy ideas (Berry and 
Berry, 1990; Canon and Baum, 1981).  While in the case of prescription drug 
policy, Gray, Lowery, and Godwin’s 2007 analysis did not find neighboring state 
adoption to explain state policy adoption, their analysis was limited to access 
prescription drug policies (i.e., Pharmacy Assistance Programs).  Thus, this 
analysis examines the influence of neighboring states on state pharmaceutical 
policy adoption beyond access to include safety and distribution.  A separate 
neighboring variable for each of the policy types (i.e., acquisition, cost, and 
safety) was created for each year in the analytic time period.  For the purpose of 
this analysis, the neighboring states variable was calculated as the percentage of 
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neighboring states that had adopted the policy the year before (Berry and Berry, 
1990).  States differ not only in population size but also in the number of 
neighboring states, thus calculating neighboring state influence in terms of a 
percentage allows for a comparable measure across states. The variable can be 
interpreted as the greater the percentage the more neighboring states that have 
adopted the policy.  The supposition being that a state with more neighbors who 
have adopted a policy may see the policy has having less risk or may face 
competition to enact a similar policy.  Below is the formula used to calculate 
neighboring states.   
  
Neighboring state  =  # of neighboring states with policy in preceding year 
     # of neighboring states 
 
 
Issues, Politics, and Ideology – Beyond the already mentioned influences of 
state population characteristics, financial and staffing resources, and neighbor 
influence, state legislators may also consider those factors related to the values, 
beliefs, and preferences of groups within the state. In particular, political parties, 
interest groups, and salient issues serve as indicators to state legislators of 
important issues.   With regard to prescription drug policy, which can be complex 
and time consuming, state legislators may look to interest groups for policy 
information.  Additionally, states legislators may rely on polls, surveys, or news 
media to ascertain the important public issues.  The following section briefly 
presents the rationale and operationalization of interest group influence, political 
party control, and issue saliency. 
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Interest Group Influence: Historically, pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
physician groups have been among the most influential party on health care 
issues.  Both have used their political influence to pressure elected officials.  
However, scholars indicate that even the most powerful interest groups (e.g., 
banking) do not always win when it comes to public policy adoption (Leech, et al, 
2007).  Thus, the question still remains whether interest groups affect adoption of 
prescription drug policy.  As discussed in Chapter 2, interest groups may 
influence legislators through legislative testimonies, information gathering, and 
the most commonly associated activity of political contribution.  The theory that 
interest groups influence state policy adoption hinges on the supposition that 
legislators will be positively influenced by either the information, testimony, or 
monetary support provided by the interest group.   
As such scholars have utilized lobby registration data to identify which 
interest groups would be particularly interested in prescription drug policy (Gray, 
Lowery, and Godwin, 2007). In an effort to examine whether interest group 
influence affects state adoption of prescription drug policy, this dissertation will 
explore the impact by utilizing the amount contributed per legislator.  While the 
amount spent does not assist in understanding the multiplicity of concerns, it 
does serve as a proxy for level of concern.  The supposition is that the greater 
the amount spent on lobbying efforts the greater the area of concern.  Amount 
spent between 1999 and 2008 was acquired from the National Institute on Money 
in State Politics, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization who gather data on 
campaign contributions for all 50 states.  The amount spent only included monies 
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associated with health care.  While the National Institute on Money in State 
Politics provides useful information on the amount contributed by lobbying 
groups, it does not account for the non-financial contributions made by interest 
groups such as emailing, testifying at hearings, and media campaigns.  The 
breadth and depth of interest group effect is an interesting topic for future 
analysis.  The lobbying financial data adequately serves to measure interest 
group effect.  Below is the formula used to calculate interest group influence. 
 
 
Interest Group Influence = total amount spent per year  
              # of legislators   
 
Issue Salience:  One of the most thought provoking questions for a country 
often considered the beacon of democracy is whether or not citizen preference 
matters in terms of public policy.  Scholars have long since indicated that issues 
matter, particularly in terms of agenda setting, policy options, and timeliness 
(Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Dahl, 1969, Key, 1961).  As discussed in Chapter 
2, issues that are of concern to constituents are more likely to get on the public 
agenda.  Additionally, salient issues may also influence policy solutions and the 
expediency with which the policy is addressed.  The theoretical supposition rests 
on the assumption that public opinion serves as an indicator of issue preference.  
Thus, one may expect the issues important to citizens to be first and foremost in 
public policy adoption.   At the state level, does public opinion make a difference 
in the actions of legislators with regard to policy adoption?  In asking this 
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question, one must first consider how legislators would be made aware of citizen 
preferences.   
On a national level public opinion polls are readily available to 
policymakers; albeit, a state level, public opinion polls are not quite as abundant 
(Turner et al, 2009; Rose, 2007).  Thus, state lawmakers must undoubtedly rely 
on a variety of sources (e.g., press coverage, health assessment surveys, and 
national public opinion) to ascertain citizen policy preference (Weissert, 1991; 
Epstein and Segal, 2000; Turner et al, 2009). Upon closer investigation one 
quickly finds that, with the exception of the debate over the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 (which grabbed national attention), prescription drug 
policy is not a typical subject matter for state public opinion polls nor is it a 
subject matter typically discussed in local news media outlets.  With the 
exception of few states (e.g., Ohio, New Jersey, and New York) that in 
conjunction with universities have developed state level polling data repositories, 
health assessment surveys may be one of the few data options available to state 
lawmakers in their quest to discover the will of the people.  According to the 
Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) website, the Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System (BRFSS) has been utilized by states to “identify health 
issues at the local level.”  Additionally, Turner et al 2009 indicate the health 
assessment questionnaires are a viable option for operationalizing issue 
saliency.  Thus, for the purpose of this analysis issue salience is based on the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Health Assessment Questionnaire.  
The BRFSS contains questions related to health status and the importance of 
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health insurance.  In particular, the BRFSS survey reports the state percentage 
of respondents who indicate that securing health services was a concern for 
them during the past 12 months.  While the BRFSS does not specifically ask the 
respondent what the most important issue facing their state is, the survey does 
provide legislators with insight into whether or not health services is an important 
issue.  Legislators could easily interpret the response as an indicator that citizens 
view prescription drug policy as an important issue.   
Ideology:  As indicated in the discussion of issue salience, state legislators 
may not always have access to information indicating the public preference on a 
particular issue such as prescription drug policy.  Absent citizen policy 
preference, state legislators may rely on the general political beliefs of the state 
citizenry when considering policy adoption.  In general, conservatives are more 
likely to believe in individual responsibility with limited government involvement, 
whereas liberals are more likely to see individuals as constrained by their 
situation needing more government assistance.  Thus, state legislators 
representing states with a greater proportion of citizens with liberal ideology will 
be more likely to adopt state prescription drug policies.  Thus it is my hypothesis 
that liberal states are more likely to adopt the prescription drug acquisition, 
safety, and distribution policies described in Chapters, 3, 4, and 5.   
Research indicates two primary approaches to measuring ideology.  The 
first method comes from Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s state citizen ideology 
measure.  It was constructed from the CBS/NYT survey results from 1976 
through 2006.  The measure represents the average of the self-reported 
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ideological identification by state.  The second method computes citizen ideology 
as a function of electorate support for the incumbent, electorate support for the 
challenger and the ideology of the incumbent and challenger (Berry, Ringquist, 
Fording, 1998).  The state ideology is computed as an average across all 
districts.  In essence, the two methods attempt to capture the conservative or 
liberalism ideology of a state, ranging from zero to one with one representing 
liberal.  According to Berry, Ringquist, and Fording (1998) and Meinke, Staton, 
and Wuhs (2005) the use of Erikson, Wright, and McIver may not be the most 
appropriate for longitudinal data.  Research indicates that ideology does vary 
over time.  Thus, this analysis will utilize the updated Berry, Ringquist, Fording 
(1998) data to operationalize ideology (Brace et al., 2004).  The selected data will 
allow for the evaluation of effect of ideology on prescription drug policy adoption.  
In essence, comparing the effect of states with a greater score (i.e., more liberal) 
on the adoption of prescription drug policy.    
 Political Party Control: Whether it is the statehouse or the White House, 
political parties undoubtedly seek to gain control.  For it is believed that through 
the control of government, political parties have access to the distribution of 
public funding and input on key policy decisions (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 
2003).  Additionally, when a single party is in control of state government (i.e., 
legislature and governorship) scholars suggest that such a situation allows for a 
greater ability to handle political issues (Berry and Berry, 1990).  In essence, to 
the extent that a unified controlled state government would be better able to 
handle obstacles, one would expect more policy adoption.  Beyond the basic 
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supposition of one party in control, research suggests it matters which party is in 
control.  In general, Democratic controlled states legislatures have been more 
supportive in terms of redistributive policies and regulatory policies than when 
their Republican counterparts are in control.  Thus, in the case of prescription 
drug policy, one would expect more policy adoption in states with Democratic 
control as opposed to states with Republican or split control 
In an attempt to capture the political party control of state government, 
political party control, in this analysis, has been measured as three separate 
dichotomous variables (i.e., Democratic, Republican, or Split).  Specifically, if the 
Democratic Party had control of both the legislature and governorship a number 
1 was assigned to the Democratic variable for that state-year.  Subsequently, if 
the Republican Party had control of both the legislature and governorship a 
number 1 was assigned to the Republican variable for that state-year. In cases 
where there no political party controlled the legislature and governorship a 
number 1 was assigned to the Split, indicating a Split Party Control.   
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Classification and Creation of Dependent Variables 
 
 The objective of this analysis was to examine the factors that affect the 
adoption of state prescription drug policies.  While the National Conference of 
State Legislatures (NCSL) provided the foundation of state prescription drug 
policies, further manipulation was required to create the dependent variable.  First, 
the prescription drug policies from 1999 through 2008 were extracted from the 
NCSL website.  A policy topic code was assigned to each policy by the NCSL.  For 
example, state legislation where the text centered on drug discount programs was 
designated with a policy topic code of D.  While the policy topic codes were useful 
in providing a guide to policy categorization, the policy description in conjunction 
with policy text was used to assign policies to a particular category (i.e., 
acquisition, safety, or distribution).  Acquisition policies were those that mentioned 
an economic principle, Medicaid, or Medicare in an effort to increase access to 
prescription medications.  Safety policies were those that mentioned the use of 
education, electronic prescribing, and databases to mitigate the possibility of 
misuse, abuse, adverse drug events, or medication errors.  Distribution policies 
were defined as those policies that prohibited or restricted the marketing and 
advertising of prescription medications or in some other way regulated the 
prescription drug distribution entities.  A policy that fit into multiple categories was 
assigned to both.  For example, a law that contained text on the Preferred Drug list 
(i.e., Access) and text on PBM regulation (i.e., Distribution) were associated with 
both categories.  As expected, there were state policies that did not fit into the 
classification schema and were categorized as Other.   
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 Second, three dummy variables were created; (1) acquisition, (2) safety, 
and (3) distribution.  For each state-year’s dummy variable, a one was assigned if 
the policy passed by the legislature and was signed into law by the Governor.   
 Third, the three dependent variables, one for each of the categories (i.e., 
acquisition, safety, and distribution), were calculated as a sum of the dummy 
variables for each state-year.  For each of the three policies for example, states 
with no policy will be assigned a zero; states with one policy related to financial of 
prescription drugs will be assigned a one; and states with two policies related to 
financial of prescription drugs will be assigned a 2; and so on. 
 Given the breadth and depth of prescription medication use, it is 
conceivable that states adopt policy changes beyond initial adoption.  For 
example, states may periodically propose legislative modification related to the 
340B Drug Pricing Program in an effort to expand the savings by adding state 
organization to the federally approved list.  Doing so would not necessarily be 
considered a new policy adoption but rather a change to the original policy.  For 
this reason, the three dependent variables include legislative adoptions regardless 
of whether they are merely a change or are newly created legislation.   
  
Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 120 
 
Statistical Analysis 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, the dependent variable, computed as the 
count of policy adoptions for a given type of prescription policy, lends itself to the 
specific event count regression approach negative binomial regression (King, 
1988, 1989). The event count model allows for the examination of phenomenon 
where events occur over a period of time and are considered rare (Hamilton, 2003, 
Cameron and Trivedi, 1986; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1987).  The number of 
policy adoptions between 1999 and 2008 is a nonnegative integer, bounded at 
zero on the low end and unbounded high end.  An event count model such as 
Poisson and negative binomial regression are the most appropriate for this type of 
data.  However, the key assumption of a Poisson regression is that the variance is 
equal to the mean.  Scholars suggest that using a Poisson regression model on 
over-dispersed data can result in inappropriately small standard errors and larger 
Z-values (King 1989; Long 1997).  According to Boehmke (2005), heterogeneity 
and contagion are two motivations for overdispersion.  Heterogeneity which can 
result from an “unobserved phenomena within a state influence the number of 
proposals reach the ballot” (Boehmke, 2005, 569).  In the case of state prescription 
drug policy, legislator sponsorship may differ across each of the prescription drug 
policy types.  Contagion refers to the situation where “the occurrence of an event 
in one time period increases the chance of additional events in the same time 
period.”  In prescription drug policy, contagion effect might occur where proponents 
of particular policy are particularly active in one year.  Thus in the case where the 
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data is over-dispersed, a negative binomial regression is more appropriate (Long, 
1997; Boehmke, 2005).     
The independent variables included in the model were demographic factors 
(i.e., age, poverty, education, urbanization, and health status), external (i.e., 
neighboring policies) and political factors (i.e., ideology, political control and issue 
salience).  SPSS version 17.0 in conjunction with Stata v8.2 was used for data and 
statistical analysis. 
In this chapter, the methodological and analytical roadmap was presented 
with a brief summary of the hypothesized factors, their rationale for inclusion and 
how the factor was operationalized.  Although linear regression and logit models 
are quite popular in the analysis of public policy, these models were not be the 
most appropriate.  A negative binomial regression analysis was identified as the 
most appropriate method of analysis.   
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CHAPTER 7:  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
  
 
 While Mark Twain conveys the opinion of many when it comes to 
quantitative analysis, and particularly statistics, it nonetheless remains a method 
often used in examining state public policy adoption.  The previous chapters 
introduced the theoretical and methodological foundation for the analysis of state 
prescription drug policy adoption.  The following chapter presents the results, 
starting first with descriptive statistics followed by the model results.  
Descriptive Results 
Over the ten year period, all 50 states adopted at least one of the 
prescription drug policies whether for acquisition, safety, or distribution.  There 
were 500 observations in the analysis, one record for each year-state over the ten 
year analytical period.  More states adopted acquisition policies than those aimed 
at safety or distribution.  Coincidentally, there were twelve different states that did 
not adopt safety and twelve states that did not adopt a distribution policy.  It is 
important to note that early in the study (i.e., 1999, 2000, and 2001), fewer states 
had adopted prescription drug policies; however, later in the study, not only were 
more states adopting policies but more policies were being adopted.  Figures 10, 
11, and 12 illustrate the geographic distribution in the year states first adopted 
prescription drug policies.  In the case of acquisition policy, it is interesting to note 
that only Nebraska and Florida adopted their first prescription drug acquisition 
policy after the passage of MMA.  Figure 11 reveals the fact that 12 states have 
not adopted prescription drug policy aimed at safety.  Similarly, more than 10 
states have failed to adopt prescription drug policy aimed at distribution.  In 
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general, the maps illustrate there is not a geographic trend related to the policy 
adoption.  There appears to be quite a bit of geographic variation with no specific 
pattern of policy adoption.  The 2005 spike in the number of acquisition policies 
illustrated in Figure 13 would coincide with legislative activities related to the 
passage of Medicare and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).  Under the MMA, 
those eligible for Medicare could enroll in Medicare Part D, which was designed to 
provide access to prescription medications for seniors.  However, states had to 
adopt legislation to address the dual-eligibles as discussed in Chapter 3.   
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Figure 10:  Year State First Adopted Acquisition Policy 
This map illustrates that states were more active in policy adoption of acquisition 
policies earlier rather than in later years. 
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Figure 11:  Year State First Adopted Safety Policy 
This map illustrates that many states have not adopted prescription drug policy 
aimed at safety.  
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Figure 12:  Year State First Adopted Distribution Policy 
This map illustrate that a few early adopter of distribution policies and many states 
have yet to adopt a distribution targeted policy.  
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Figure 13:  Policy Count by Year and Type 
This chart illustrates that states have been more active on acquisition policies and 
were especially active during the period just before MMA went into effect. 
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Table 9 displays the descriptive results for the predictor variables.  On 
average, 12% of the states’ population was over the age of 65 and coincidentally 
12% of the states’ population was below the federal poverty level.  The average 
percent of a state’s population over the age of 25 with a bachelor’s degree was 
26%.  According to the analytical description, more of a states’ population live in 
urban areas than in rural areas.  In fact, the results indicate that on average over 
two-thirds of a states’ population live in urban areas.  The BRFSS survey results 
indicate that on average the states’ population report being healthy.  The results 
indicate a wide variation in the number of staff per legislator, ranging from less 
than 1 to more than 20, with an average of approximately 5.   
On average, interest groups contributed just under $10,000 per legislator, 
however the variation was quite large.  Louisiana and Wyoming have the lowest 
reported contributions per legislator with less than $200 in some years.  California 
has the highest reported contribution with more than $50,000 in 1999 and over 
$100,000 in 2008 per legislator.   The average percent for neighboring states with 
policies is greater for acquisition policies than for safety and distribution: 39%, 
16%, and 13% respectively.  As expected, health care is an important issue.  On 
average, health care is a problem for 61% of a state’s population.  Not surprisingly, 
the descriptive statistics indicate that states do not typically have large rate of slack 
resources.  In fact, range indicates that some states have more expenditures than 
they do revenue streams.  While the 2009 national Gallup polls suggest slightly 
higher rates than that presented in this analysis, the results from this analysis have 
a consistent pattern in that conservative ideology is more prevalent than that of 
Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 129 
 
liberal ideology.  According to the descriptive results, policymakers most often find 
themselves in state governments with split party control.  Table 9 indicates that on 
average Democratic control of state legislatures occurs less often that of 
Republican or Split Control.   
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Factor Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
State population over the age 
of 65 
0.12 0.02 0.44 0.19 
Proportion of Population 
below FPL (Poverty) 
0.12 0.03 0.05 0.23 
Proportion of opulation over 
25 with Bachelor’s Degree 
0.26 .046 0.14 0.38 
Proportion of population living 
in urban areas 
0.73 0.17 0.30 0.99 
Proportion of Population 
healthy 
0.85 0.05 0.65 0.92 
Financial capacity 0.05 0.16 -0.39 1.25 
Staff per legislator 4.87 4.15 0.32 21.75 
Neighboring States with Policy 
Adoption 
0.39a 
0.16b 
0.13c 
0.33a 
0.22b 
0.20c 
0.00a 
0.00b 
0.00c 
1.00a 
1.00b 
1.00c 
Interest group financial 
support 
$9,456 $13,783 $118 $110,552 
Issue salience 0.86 0.42 0.71 0.95 
Liberal political Ideology - % 
liberal 
0.47 0.26 0.00 0.98 
Democratic Party Control  0.19 0.39 0 1 
Republican Party Control 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Split Party Control 0.44 0.49 0 1 
Table 9:  Descriptive Statistics for Predictor Variables over All State Years 
(1999-2008) (n=500) 
aProportion of neighboring policies with acquisition policies 
bProportion of neighboring policies with safety policies 
cProportion of neighboring policies with distribution policies  
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Model Results 
  
My hypotheses are based on the research premise that internal and 
external factors influence the actions of decision makers when it comes to 
prescription drug policy.  A substantial amount of previous research is consistent 
with my hypothesis (Walker 1969; Gray 1973, Berry and Berry 1990; Gray, Godwin 
and Lowery 2007).  The results of my research provide an addition to the previous 
scholarship indicating a relationship between these factors and state policy 
adoption.   
In the empirical examination of factors effecting state adoption of 
prescription drug policies, I estimated a series of negative binomial regression 
models.  The first model estimates the effect on policy adoption of acquisition 
policies with all factors included in the model.  The second model includes the 
same factors but analyzes the effect on safety policy adoption, whereas the third 
model analyzes the effect on distribution policy adoption.  The following section 
describes the results from each of the three models. 
Acquisition 
Prior to conducting the negative binomial regression, a histogram verified 
that the data was in fact non-linear and thus not appropriate for linear regression.  
Figure 14 illustrates that the count of prescription drug policies adopted over a ten-
year period is skewed.   
Table 10 displays the negative binomial regression model results for 
prescription drug policy adoptions aimed at acquisition.  There are several 
important items to which one should pay particular attention.   First, the log 
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likelihood of –726.83 was statistically significant indicating that the predictor 
variables are not equal to zero and the model is significantly different from zero.  
This result suggests that the model ”fits” in the sense that it explains variation in 
the dependent variable.  Second, the likelihood ratio-test of alpha equal to zero 
indicates that the data is over-dispersed and thus supports the use of a negative 
binomial over a Poisson distribution.  Figure 15 illustrates that the data fit a 
negative binomial distribution better than the corresponding Poisson distribution.  
The probability of a zero policies adopted increases from 0.25 using the Poisson 
regression model to 0.57 with the negative binomial regression model.  In 
essence, Figure 15 illustrates that there is a larger probability for greater policy 
counts in the negative binomial regression than that of the Poisson regression. 
Lastly, the results indicate that with the exception of the educational 
attainment variable, state composition variables did not influence the adoption of 
acquisition policies.  In other words, the variables served to indicate need were not 
influential in the adoption of acquisition policies.  The positive coefficient of 
educational attainment indicates that for every one percent increase in the 
percentage of the states’ population over the age of 25 who have a bachelor’s 
degree, the difference in the logs of expected counts of the response variables is 
expected to change by 7.91, while holding the other predictor variables constant.   
Neighboring policy adoption and political ideology were statistically 
significant in the effect on acquisition policy adoption.  The analysis appears to 
support the supposition that the policymaking of neighboring states makes a 
difference.  The greater the percent of the states’ neighbors who have adopted a 
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policy, the greater the number of acquisition policies. The positive coefficient of 
neighboring state policies indicates that for every one percent increase in the 
percentage of states’ neighbors who have adopted an access policy, the difference 
in the logs of expected counts of the response variables is expected to change by 
1.45, while holding the other predictor variables constant.   
Consistent with the theory, the results indicate that ideology tends to 
correspond to higher counts of prescription drug policies aimed at access.   
Specifically, the results suggest a positive effect between political ideology and 
higher counts of state access prescription drug policies; the more liberal a state the 
more access policies it adopts.  The positive coefficient of neighboring state 
policies indicates that for every one percent increase in the percentage of states’ 
population that indicate liberal ideology, the difference in the logs of expected 
counts of the response variables is expected to change by 1.12, while holding the 
other predictor variables constant.  Based on the negative binomial regression 
results, Figure 16 presents the factors that have an effect on state adoption of 
prescription drug acquisition policies. 
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Figure 14:  Histogram of State Prescription Drug Acquisition Policies 
This graph illustrates the data are strongly skewed, not conducive for linear 
regression.  
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Figure 15:  Negative Binomial Distribution for Acquisition Model 
This graph illustrates the data fit a negative binomial distribution better than the 
poisson distribution.  
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Variable Coefficient Z value 
Proportion of state population over the age of 
65 
3.33 
(3.47) 
0.96 
Proportion of population below FPL (Poverty) -1.05 
(2.64) 
-0.40 
Proportion of population over 25 with 
Bachelor’s Degree 
7.91* 
(2.13) 
3.71 
Proportion population living in urban areas -0.59 
(0.57) 
-1.05 
Proportion population healthy -3.41 
(1.96) 
-1.73 
Financial capacity 0.26 
(0.54) 
0.49 
Staff per legislator 0.00 
(0.03) 
0.26 
Proportion of Neighboring States with Policy 
Adoption 
1.47* 
(0.23) 
6.37 
Interest group financial support 0.00 
(0.00) 
1.42 
Issue salience -1.47 
(1.96) 
-0.75 
% liberal political Ideology - % liberal 1.12* 
(0.46) 
2.41 
Republican Party Control  0.28 
(0.32) 
0.89 
Split Party Control 0.02 
(0.21) 
0.11 
Constant -6.65 
(2.25) 
-2.95 
Alpha 1.59 
(0.21) 
 
   
Table 10:  Results from Prescription Drug Acquisition Model, Negative Binomial 
Regression 1999-2008.  
Note: *p<0.05 Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Log-likelihood = -726.83 
Chi-Square(13) = 99.37 
N=500  
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Figure 16:  Predictor Variables of State Prescription Drug Acquisition Policies 
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Safety 
 As indicated in Figure 17 the distribution of state prescription drug policies 
aimed at safety is clearly skewed.  Similar to the acquisition policies, the skewed 
data suggest the use of a negative binomial regression analysis.  
Table 11 displays the results Z scores and coefficients from the negative binomial 
regression model for prescription drug safety policies.  The log likelihood value of -
289.47 was statistically further indicating the coefficients in the model are not equal 
to zero.  This result suggests that the model is fit.  Additionally, the likelihood ratio-
test (LR) of alpha equal to zero indicates that the data is over-dispersed, 
supporting the use of a negative binomial over a Poisson distribution.  Figure 18 
indicates no benefit of the negative binomial distribution over the Poisson 
distribution for safety policies.  The probability of a zero policies adopted increases 
from 0.78 using the Poisson regression model to 0.81 with the negative binomial 
regression model.  In essence, Figure 18 illustrates that there is a larger 
probability, albeit only slightly, for greater policy counts in the negative binomial 
regression than that of the Poisson regression. 
 Similar to the adoption of acquisition policies, the model did indicate that of 
the population composite factors (i.e., elderly, poverty, educational attainment, 
health status, and urbanization) only education were statistically significant.  The 
positive coefficient of educational attainment indicates that for every one percent 
increase in the percentage of the states’ population over the age of 25 who have a 
bachelor’s degree, the difference in the logs of expected counts of the response 
variables is expected to change by 7.87, while holding the other predictor variables 
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constant.  In essence, the greater the proportion of state residents over the age of 
25 with a bachelor’s degree the greater the probability of states adopting a 
prescription drug policy aimed at safety.  The proportion of as state’s population 
with a bachelor’s degree was not only consistently influential across all three 
models but it was the most influential. 
The states’ financial capacity also appeared to influence state policy 
adoption aimed at safety.  The positive coefficient indicates that states with more 
slack resources adopted more safety prescription drug policies.  The positive 
coefficient of financial capacity indicates that for every one percent increase in the 
ratio of expenditures to revenue, the difference in the logs of expected counts of 
the response variables is expected to change by 2.30, while holding the other 
predictor variables constant.  In essence, the results suggest that the greater the 
state’s slack resources the greater the number of safety policies adopted. 
The model results related to the influence of neighboring states with policy 
adoptions is consistent with my hypothesis.  The impact of neighboring policies 
indicated that an increase in the percentage of neighboring states adopting a 
prescription drug safety policy in the preceding year might result in an increase in 
the estimated incidence of safety prescription drug policy by a factor of 1.62.  In 
essence, the results suggest that there a positive effect on the number of safety 
policies adopted the greater the proportion of surrounding states who have 
adopted prescription drug policy aimed at safety. 
Additionally, the salience of an issue had an effect on the state prescription 
drug policy adoption; however, it was counter to my hypothesis.  The negative 
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coefficient indicates that the greater the issue saliency the fewer policies adopted.  
While the results are counter to my hypothesis, it suggests that health care as an 
important issue results in fewer safety policy adoptions.  One possible explanation 
may be that attention to a prescription drug safety issue lessens the likelihood that 
policies will actually be adopted.  Figure 19 displays the negative binomial 
regression factors that influence adoption of safety policies. 
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Figure 17:  Histogram of Prescription Drug Safety Policies 
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Figure 18:  Negative Binomial Distribution for Safety Model 
This figure displays the proportion of policies adopted is consistent for both the 
negative binomial and Poisson regression.  
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Variable Coefficient Z value 
Proportion of state population over the age of 65 
8.35 
(5.93) 
1.41 
Proportion of population below FPL (Poverty) 0.58 
(4.51) 
0.13 
Proportion of population over 25 with Bachelor’s 
Degree 
7.87* 
(3.64) 
2.15 
Proportion population living in urban areas 0.47 
(0.95) 
0.50 
Proportion population healthy -3.67 
(2.18) 
-1.69 
Financial capacity 2.30* 
(0.90) 
2.55 
Staff per legislator -0.05 
(0.05) 
-1.20 
Proportion of Neighboring States with Policy 
Adoption 
1.62* 
(0.56) 
2.91 
Interest group financial support 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.49 
Issue salience -8.66* 
(3.07) 
-2.82 
% liberal political Ideology - % liberal -0.26 
(0.74) 
-0.37 
Republican Party Control  -0.42 
(0.50) 
-0.84 
Split Party Control -0.44 
(0.34) 
-1.31 
Constant -1.87 
(3.36) 
-0,54 
Alpha 2.29 
(0.62) 
 
Table 11: Results from Prescription Drug Safety Model, Negative Binomial 
Regression 1999-2008.  
Note: *p<0.05 Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Log-likelihood = -289.47 
Chi-Square(13) = 40.61 
N=500 
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Figure 19:  Predictor Variables of State Prescription Drug Safety Policies 
This graphic presents the significant factors in the negative binomial regression 
analysis.   
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Distribution 
 Figure 20 displays the distribution of state prescription drug distribution 
policies.  The histogram depicts the data is skewed to the right, thus supporting the 
use of a negative binomial regression.   
The negative binomial regression model results for prescription drug policy 
adoptions are presented in Table 12.  Based on the results, the log likelihood of -
248.44 indicates a statistically significant model.  This result suggests that the 
model is fit.  While Figure 21 indicates no benefit of the negative binomial 
distribution compared to Poisson regression, the likelihood ratio-test (LR) of alpha 
equal to zero indicates that the data is over-dispersed.  Thus, the use of a negative 
binomial was selected over a Poisson regression analysis.   
Consistent with the access model, the negative binomial model using count 
of distribution policies indicates that educational attainment and neighboring 
policies influences policy adoption.  A coefficient of 11.72 indicates that the 
educational variable has the stronger effect.  The impact of educational attainment 
indicate that for every one percent increase in the percentage of the states’ 
population over the age of 25 who have a bachelor’s degree, the difference in the 
logs of expected counts of the response variables is expected to change by 11.72, 
while holding the other predictor variables constant.   
The research appears to support the supposition that the policymaking of 
neighboring states makes a difference.  The greater the percent of the states’ 
neighbors who have adopted a policy, the greater the number of state prescription 
drug policies aimed at distribution.  Specifically, the coefficients indicate that a one 
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unit increase in the percentage of neighbors with a distribution policy will have a 
1.37 effect.   
Also of considerable interest is the model results related to the influence of 
interest groups.  Unlike the models for safety and access, the distribution model 
indicates that the financial contributions made by interest groups to policymakers 
matter when it comes to state prescription drug policy aimed at distribution.  While 
the coefficient results (1.10) indicate a smaller effect than education, it is most 
interesting to note that the financial contribution was not a factor for the other two 
types of prescription drug policy.  Figure 20 presents the factors that may influence 
state adoption of prescription drug distribution policies as indicated by the negative 
binomial regression results. 
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Figure 20:  Histogram of State Prescription Drug Distribution Policies 
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Figure 21:  Negative Binomial Distribution for Distribution Model  
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Variable Coefficient Z value 
Proportion of state population over the age of 65 
12.52 
(6.52) 
1.92 
Proportion of population below FPL (Poverty) 3.43 
(5.10) 
0.67 
Proportion of population over 25 with Bachelor’s 
Degree 
11.72* 
(3.99) 
2.93 
Proportion population living in urban areas -1.49 
(0.99) 
-1.50 
Proportion population healthy -1.52 
(3.09) 
-0.49 
Financial capacity 1.10 
(0.88) 
1.26 
Staff per legislator -0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.88 
Proportion of Neighboring States with Policy 
Adoption 
1.37* 
(0.60) 
2.28 
Interest group financial support 0.00* 
(0.00) 
2.38 
Issue salience -3.12 
(3.62) 
-0.86 
% liberal political Ideology - % liberal -0.30 
(0.80) 
-0.38 
Republican Party Control  -0.63 
(0.55) 
-1.16 
Split Party Control -0.58 
(0.35) 
-1.67 
Constant -9.02 
(4.10) 
-2.20 
Alpha 2.21 
(0.68) 
 
Table 12:  Results from Prescription Drug Distribution Model, Negative Binomial 
Regression 1999-2008.  
Note: *p<0.05 Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Log-likelihood = -248.44 
Chi-Square(13) = 35.34 
N=500 
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Figure 22:  Predictor Variables of State Prescription Drug Distribution Policies 
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  While each prescription drug policy type was explored separately, there are 
several important items to notice about the results.  First, the proportion of a state’s 
population with a bachelor’s degree was not only consistently influential across all 
three models but it was the most influential.  Additionally, across all three of the 
models, the state population composition variables, with the exception of 
educational attainment, were not significant.  This was a surprising finding in that 
these factors served as indicators of need.  As indicated by John Kingdon (2003), 
policymakers may rely on indicators as to what issues are of public concern.  Thus 
as indicated in Chapter 2, one would suppose that states with a greater need (i.e., 
those with older, unhealthy, or poor) would have more policy adoptions.  However, 
the results indicate that the factors used to proxy the potential need for 
pharmaceuticals were not influential in policy adoption.  After further review, the 
result may be explained from the fact that prescription medications is a subset part 
of a larger health care issue and thus may not be influenced by the same factors 
as health care in general.     
Second, in each of the three models, the policymaking of neighboring states 
made an impact.  Thus the evidence does suggest that state legislators may rely 
on the policymaking of neighboring states to address the challenges of constraints 
(e.g., time and resources) or competitive federalism.  As revealed in Chapter 2, 
prescription drug policy can be complex thus the legislators may look to their 
neighbor for assistance.   
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Third and most notable, is the fact that the pattern of influence of key 
variables across the three models is inconsistent.  The theoretical supposition on 
which this analysis originated was that the prescription drug policies are not 
consistent and thus would be influenced by a variety of factors.  These results 
provide evidence to support the theoretical foundation.  As seen in Table 20, the 
significant factors do vary by prescription drug policy type.  While two factors (i.e., 
educational attainment and neighboring state influence) are influential in two of the 
models, the factors that affect prescription drug policy do vary by policy.  For 
example, financial capacity is only influential in safety policies.  Additionally, the 
importance of the health care issue is only significant in the safety model.  Political 
ideology is only a significant factor related to the adoption of acquisition policies, 
whereas interest group financial support per legislator is only a significant factor 
related to distribution policies.   
Overall, the results suggest that the factors influencing adoption of state 
prescription drug policy do differ.  Neighboring state policymaking, educational 
attainment, and political ideology affects prescription drug policy aimed at 
acquisition.  While the hypothesis that political ideology mattered was true for 
acquisition policies, it was not influential in the adoption of distribution related 
policies.  This was a surprising result in that one would expect the more 
conservative state ideology the less likely they would be to intervene in business in 
terms of adopting regulatory policies and less likely to provide government 
assistance in terms of access policies.       
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Variable Acquisition 
Coefficient 
Safety 
Coefficient 
Distribution 
Coefficient 
Proportion of state population over 
the age of 65 
3.33 
(3.47) 
8.35 
(5.93) 
12.52 
(6.52) 
Proportion of population below FPL 
(Poverty) 
-1.05 
(2.64) 
0.58 
(4.51) 
3.43 
(5.10) 
Proportion of population over 25 with 
Bachelor’s Degree 
7.91* 
(2.13) 
7.87* 
(3.64) 
11.72* 
(3.99) 
Proportion population living in urban 
areas 
-0.59 
(0.57) 
0.47 
(0.95) 
-1.49 
(0.99) 
Proportion population healthy -3.41 
(1.96) 
-3.67 
(2.18) 
-1.52 
(3.09) 
Financial capacity 0.26 
(0.54) 
2.30* 
(0.90) 
1.10 
(0.88) 
Staff per legislator 0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
Proportion of Neighboring States 
with Policy Adoption 
1.47* 
(0.23) 
1.62* 
(0.56) 
1.37* 
(0.60) 
Interest group financial support 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
Issue salience -1.47 
(1.96) 
-8.66* 
(3.07) 
-3.12 
(3.62) 
% liberal political Ideology - % liberal 1.12* 
(0.46) 
-0.26 
(0.74) 
-0.30 
(0.80) 
Republican Party Control  0.28 
(0.32) 
-0.42 
(0.50) 
-0.63 
(0.55) 
Split Party Control 0.02 
(0.21) 
-0.44 
(0.34) 
-0.58 
(0.35) 
Constant -6.65 
(2.25) 
-1.87 
(3.36) 
-9.02 
(4.10) 
Alpha 1.59 
(0.21) 
2.29 
(0.62) 
2.21 
(0.68) 
Table 13:  Results from the Negative Binomial Models  
Note:  This table presents a side-by-side comparison of the coefficients for all three 
negative binomial regression models. *p<0.05. N=500.  
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Limitations 
 
The study has several limitations.  The first is the commonly accepted 
limitation associated with data availability.  Undoubtedly, the invention of the 
internet has made data more readily available than at any other point in time; 
however, researchers still face data limitations.  Although there were obvious 
situations (i.e., issue salience and interest groups) where ideal datasets were 
not readily available, it is the belief of this researcher that the measurements 
used serve as an adequate indicator to measure the intended construct.   
Second, while regression analysis assists researchers in examining the 
dependence of one variable on another it does not abdicate causation.  In 
essence, the presence of a relationship between X and Y variables does not 
necessarily mean that X caused Y.  In the case of state prescription drug 
policy, the statistical significance of certain factors (e.g., ideology, education, 
interest group support) does not indicate that these factors cause state 
legislators to adopt policies, but simply that there is a relationship and to some 
degree influence.  The limitation in the ability to substantiate causality has a 
direct impact on how the results may be applied.  
While my dissertation provides insight into the variation of factors 
influencing state prescription drug policy adoption, it does not provide indication 
to the substantive question related to policy outcomes.  Understanding what 
factors are present in policy adoption are informative for activities of agenda 
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setting, policy options and their expediency, appears to omit the major 
component of whether or not the policy was successful.  
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CHAPTER 8:  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of 
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of incredulity, 
it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness…” Charles 
Dickens from a Tale of Two Cities 
 
Although written some time ago, Dickens’ quote seems as fitting to the 
prescription drug world of today as it did in describing England and France during 
the 18th century.  The availability of new therapies, lower cost generics, and 
innovative biotechnological medications has made this a provocative time in health 
care.  Specifically, over the past decade, new and lower cost prescription 
medications have assisted patients in their quest for health and save overall health 
care dollars.  For example, evidence suggests consistently taking one’s medication 
can reduce overall medical costs (American Diabetes Association, 2007; American 
Heart Association, 2009; Sokol et al, 2005).  However, the rising drug costs, drugs 
removed from the market and pharmaceutical manufacturer profits have spawned 
greater government attention to the issue or prescription drug policy.  The focus of 
this dissertation was to gain a better understanding as to what factors are 
influential in states adopting pharmaceutical policies.      
Future Research 
 While the analysis of prescription drug policy adoption expands on the 
current state policy adoption literature, the analysis presented here could be 
expanded to explore the impact of predictor variables.  The variables selected for 
this analysis were consistent with those used in seminal state policy adoption 
literature.  In addition, analysis could be expanded to analyze policies categorized 
as Other.   
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 Future research could benefit from further exploration beyond that 
dependent on quantitative analysis.  According to William W. Watt, “Don’t put your 
faith in what statistics say until you have carefully considered what they do not 
say.”  As such, one might explore a mixed-method approach using qualitative data 
of interviewing state legislators on the issue of prescription drug policy.  In terms of 
statistical research, future research might explore the use of Cox regression or 
more sophisticated statistical techniques such as those indicated in the Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004 article.   
Related to the affect of neighboring states on prescription drug policy, future 
research might include analysis of policies resulting from federal government 
legislative activity.  For example, there was significant activity after the passage of 
the Medicare Modernization act; presumably in reaction to the federal policies.  
However, not all states adopted MMA related policies, thus it would be interesting 
to look at difference between the two.   
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 While political science scholars have spent over 40 years expanding on the 
seminal work of Walker (1969) and researchers have investigated a variety of 
policy areas, the results from this analysis indicate there is always room for more 
analysis on state policy adoption (Walker 880-99;Mohr 111-26;Gray 1174-85;Berry 
and Berry 395-415;Case, Hines, and Rosen 285-307;Mintrom 41-59;Berry and 
Baybeck 505-19).  This dissertation expands on the existing literature by 
examining the variation of factor influence within one particular policy area.  
Specifically, this dissertation explored the idea that factors influential in state policy 
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adoption were not consistent within one policy area, but rather the influential 
factors are as varied as the policies themselves.    
While the analysis is limited to the last decade of state prescription drug 
policies, the research and subsequent findings expand on the innovation and 
diffusion literature.  The research is of particular importance in our understanding 
of factors present in state policy adoption of a particular health care issue.  In 
particular, the study contributes to our understanding of what factors are influential 
in the area of state prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition, safety, and 
distribution.   
 Consistent with previous research of Gray, et al (2007), this analysis 
establishes that organized interests had little effect on the passage of prescription 
policy adoption related to acquisition (i.e., Pharmacy Assistance Programs).  
However, the results from this dissertation indicate that the findings of interest 
group influence should not be applied to all prescription drug policies but rather 
judiciously depending on the policy objective.  In the case of state prescription drug 
distribution policies, whose objective is to regulate distributors, the findings 
suggest that interest group contributions to state legislators were influential when 
related to distribution policies but not influential in acquisition and safety related 
policies.   
 The study further supports the existing theory that neighboring state 
policymaking influences state policy adoption.  While previous scholars have 
explored the impact of neighboring policy adoption, this research broadens our 
application the neighboring state effect to additional policy topic areas.  
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Metaphorically speaking, the results indicate that what is going on next door 
matters.  Specifically, the policymaking of neighboring states was influential in all 
three types of prescription drug policy.  
One of the most provocative questions, not only political scientists but for 
citizens as well, is whether or not public opinion matters.  Does the public 
preference influence the policies adopted by lawmakers?  In the 2009 health care 
reform debate many would argue the fact that public opinion matters, but on the 
issue of state prescription drug policy it was only influential in the case of safety 
policies.  One could speculate that news coverage may be greater on prescription 
drug safety issues as opposed to distribution or acquisition.  However, without 
specific public opinion data or data on state news coverage it is difficult to 
ascertain why issue saliency was a factor for safety as opposed to acquisition or 
distribution policies. 
While the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordability Act of 2010 is 
undoubtedly a monumental event, much of what had already been accomplished 
in terms of access to health care has come at the state level.  For an example of 
state activism on the issue of health care, one need only look at the number of 
prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition to get a sense of the work done at 
the state level.  As presented in this dissertation, states vary in their policies 
adopted and the factors influencing those adoptions.  As the federal government 
begins implementation, the results presented in this dissertation suggest that the 
institutional, demographic, political party control and public preference may 
influence how the policy is implemented at the state levels.  
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APPENDIX 1:  VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES 
Variable Description Source 
State Two digit state abbreviation  
Year 1999-2008  
Predictor Variables   
  Need: Elderly Percent of state population over 65 yrs of 
age 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (various 
years) 
  Need: Poverty Percent of state population below the 
federal poverty level 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (various 
years) 
  Need: Education Percent of state population over the age of 
25 with a Bachelor’s degree 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (various 
years) 
  Need: Urbanization Percent of state population living in 
metropolitan statistical area 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (various 
years) 
  Need: Health Status Percent of survey respondents who 
indicated “Good Health” on the BRFFs 
survey  
Center for Chronic Disease Control 
  Capacity: Fiscal Percentage of total state revenue minus the 
total state spending 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (various 
years) 
  Capacity: 
Professionalization 
Number of staff per legislator National Conference of State 
Legislatures (various years) 
  Neighbor Adoption Number of neighboring states with policy in 
preceding year 
National Conference of State 
Legislatures (various years) 
  Interest Group Dollar amount spent per legislative seat in 
2004 
Follow the money.org 
  Issue Salience Percent of respondents who indicated  
health care is an important issue 
Center for Chronic Disease Control 
  Ideology Citizen ideology ranging 0 to 1 with 1 being 
liberal 
Berry, Ringquist, Fording and 
Hanson 
  Party Control Split political party National Conference of State 
Legislatures (various years) 
Dependent Variables   
  Access policies Count of prescription drug policies aimed at 
access 
NCSL 
  Safety policies Count of prescription drug policies aimed at 
safety 
NCSL 
  Distribution policies Count of prescription drug policies aimed at 
distribution 
NCSL 
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